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Protecting Big Data in the Big Leagues: 
Trade Secrets in Professional Sports 
Lara Grow* & Nathaniel Grow** 
Abstract 
The protection of trade secrets within the professional sports 
industry became a hot-button issue in the summer of 2015, after 
news reports emerged revealing that officials from Major League 
Baseball’s St. Louis Cardinals were under federal investigation for 
having illegally accessed proprietary information belonging to their 
league rival, the Houston Astros. Indeed, professional sports teams 
in the United States and Canada often possess various forms of 
proprietary information or processes—ranging from scouting 
reports and statistical analyses to dietary regimens and 
psychological assessment techniques—giving them a potential 
competitive advantage over their rivals. Unfortunately, as with the 
rest of the economy at-large, little empirical data exists regarding 
either the types of proprietary information owned by these teams, or 
the measures that teams are taking to protect their trade secrets.  
Drawing upon freshly-collected survey data, this Article helps 
to fill this void in the literature by providing novel empirical 
evidence regarding the modern trade secret practices of the teams 
in the four major North American professional sports leagues. 
Based on the results of a first-of-its-kind survey conducted in the 
spring of 2016 of the general counsels of teams in the four major 
leagues, this Article sheds light on both the types of information 
subjected to trade secret assertion by these firms, as well as the 
methods they are using to safeguard their data. In the process, this 
Article examines the implications of these survey results for the 
professional sports industry, while also identifying potential new 
lines of inquiry for future trade secret research. 
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I. Introduction 
Seal up your lips, and give no words but mum: 
The business asketh silent secrecy. 
—Shakespeare1 
A veil of secrecy has descended over sports unlike 
anything the industry has ever seen. 
—Matthew Futterman2 
                                                                                                     
 1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF KING HENRY THE SIXTH act 
1, sc. 2. 
 2. Matthew Futterman, Baseball After Moneyball, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 30, 
2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405311190379150457658469168 
3234216 (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
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Society is currently in the midst of a “big data” revolution.3 
Across wide swaths of the economy, businesses are increasingly 
marshalling previously unimaginable amounts of data to derive 
valuable new insights in fields as diverse as health care,4 financial 
services,5 and transportation.6 Indeed, through the use of data 
analytics, firms can more efficiently “anticipate future needs and 
concerns, plan strategically, avoid loss, and manage risk,” all for 
the betterment of the bottom-line.7 
Nowhere has this big data revolution played out more 
publicly—or, perhaps, more prominently—than in the professional 
sports industry. Every day, millions of sports fans are exposed to 
countless new and ever more sophisticated statistics while 
watching their favorite teams play.8 Meanwhile, behind the 
scenes, teams in all four major North American professional sports 
leagues9 are increasingly using statistical and data analysis to not 
only formulate in-game strategy, but also to evaluate their players’ 
on-field performance, physical health, and even psychological 
make-up.10 
                                                                                                     
 3. See, e.g., Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Big Data Ethics, 49 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 393, 393 (2014) (stating that “[w]e are on the cusp of a ‘Big 
Data’ Revolution” in which “[i]ncreasingly large datasets are being mined for 
important predictions and often surprising insights”). 
 4. See Janine S. Hiller, Healthy Predictions? Questions for Data Analytics 
in Health Care, 53 AM. BUS. L.J. 251, 251 (2016) (observing that “[b]ig data, 
analytics, and predictive algorithms are poised to play a large part in the 
transformation of health-care delivery in the United States”). 
 5. See Dru Stevenson & Nicholas J. Wagoner, Bargaining in the Shadow of 
Big Data, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1337, 1387 (2015) (noting “the advent of big-data-based 
decision-making in the financial sectors”). 
 6. See Katherine Britton, Handling Privacy and Security in the Internet of 
Things, 19 J. INTERNET L. 3, 6 (2016) (predicting that the transportation industry 
will be able to derive “tremendous economic value realized as a result of Big 
Data”). 
 7. Ian Kerr & Jessica Earle, Prediction, Preemption, Presumption: How Big 
Data Threatens Big Picture Privacy, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 65, 66 (2013). 
 8. See Steve Eder, Modern Stats Bring WAR to Broadcast Booth, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 1, 2013, at A1 (noting that teams in professional baseball increasingly 
expect their announcers to discuss advanced statistics during broadcasts). 
 9. For purposes of this Article, the four major North American sports 
leagues are Major League Baseball (MLB), the National Basketball Association 
(NBA), National Football League (NFL), and the National Hockey League (NHL). 
 10. See David L. Gregory & Joseph Gagliano, A Message From the 
Symposium Chairs, 22 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 163, 165 (2012) (finding 
that professional sports teams use “the never-ending litany of increasingly 
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Despite the growing importance of big data in the modern 
economy, however, surprisingly little is known about the specific 
manner in which firms—either in the professional sports industry 
or the economy at-large—protect their proprietary information. 
Because methods of data analysis are most commonly protected 
under the law of trade secrecy,11 and because trade secrets 
generally lose their legal protection if they are disclosed publicly,12 
firms have traditionally been understandably reluctant to discuss 
either the types of trade secrets they possess, or the steps that they 
are taking to protect this information.13 
                                                                                                     
complex statistics . . . to evaluate and ‘value’ players”); see also Rian Watt, New 
Technologies Are Forcing Baseball to Balance Big Data with “Big Brother”, VICE 
SPORTS (May 27, 2016, 10:20 AM), https://sports.vice.com/en_us/article/8qygbp 
/new-technologies-are-forcing-baseball-to-balance-big-data-with-big-brother (last 
visited Sept. 21, 2017) (discussing the various ways in which MLB teams are 
utilizing new biometric tracking technology to evaluate players) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 11. See Michael Mattioli, Disclosing Big Data, 99 MINN. L. REV. 535, 556 
(2014) (stating that “[m]any big data practices can probably be maintained as 
trade secrets”); see also Ariel Porat & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Personalizing 
Default Rules and Disclosure With Big Data, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1417, 1435 (2014) 
(reporting that “many uses of Big Data are being kept as proprietary trade 
secrets”); Matthew J. Frankel, Secret Sabermetrics: Trade Secret Protection in the 
Baseball Analytics Field, 5 ALBANY GOV’T L. REV. 240, 250 (2012) (observing that 
professional baseball teams “treat their [statistical] strategies and formulas as 
trade secrets”). For a more in-depth discussion of the reasons why data analysis 
is typically protected under trade secret law, see infra notes 50–51 and 
accompanying text. 
 12. See infra Part II (discussing the legal requirements for obtaining trade 
secret protection under U.S. and Canadian law). 
 13. See David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret 
Litigation in Federal Courts, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 291, 295 (2009) (“[L]ittle statistical 
analysis exists on either trade secrets or trade secret litigation. For trade secrets, 
the explanation is simple—because trade secrets must be kept secret to qualify 
for protection, there is little publicly available material to study.”); see also 
Frankel, supra note 11, at 242 (“One possible explanation for the dearth of 
scholarship or press reports in this area is that trade secrets are, by their nature, 
a secret, and thus do not lend themselves to public exposition or dissection.”). 
Indeed, the only prior studies that the authors could locate that (1) identified the 
types of information that were being subjected to trade secret protection or 
(2) discussed the specific methods that businesses were using to protect this 
information, came from two industrial surveys conducted back in 1965 and 1971, 
respectively. See generally J. ROGER O’MEARA, HOW SMALLER COMPANIES PROTECT 
THEIR TRADE SECRETS (1971) [hereinafter O’MEARA, HOW SMALLER COMPANIES 
PROTECT THEIR TRADE SECRETS] (reporting survey data regarding the trade secret 
practices of small businesses in the early 1970s); J. ROGER O’MEARA, EMPLOYEE 
PATENT AND SECRECY AGREEMENTS (1965) [hereinafter O’MEARA, EMPLOYEE 
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This Article aims to help fill this void in the existing literature 
by presenting freshly-collected data from the professional team 
sports industry regarding both the types of information being 
subjected to trade secret protection, as well as the manner in which 
those secrets are being guarded. Drawing upon the results of a 
survey recently conducted of the general counsels of teams 
belonging to the four major North American professional sports 
leagues, this Article sheds new light on the scope of trade secret 
protection in the modern economy, as well as the steps that these 
firms are taking to shield their increasingly valuable, but highly 
sensitive, information. 
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part II briefly summarizes 
the historical evolution of statistical and data analysis in the 
professional sports industry, describing the various forms of 
proprietary information that a modern-day sports team may 
possess.14 Part III follows by offering an overview of the law of 
trade secrets in both the United States and Canada.15 Part IV then 
presents our survey methodology and results, providing novel 
empirical data regarding the manner in which North American 
professional sports teams are asserting and protecting their rights 
under trade secrecy law.16 Finally, Part V concludes by discussing 
the implications of this survey data, as well as offering some 
recommendations for future research.17 
II. Propriety Information in the Professional Sports Industry 
Since its inception, the professional sports industry has, to 
varying degrees, relied on a plethora of statistical data to evaluate 
players and help teams make roster decisions. As early as 1845—
nearly a quarter century before the first professional sports 
franchise, the Cincinnati Red Stockings of 1869, was established—
newspapers began printing box scores recapping the statistical 
                                                                                                     
PATENT AND SECRECY AGREEMENTS] (reporting survey data regarding business’s 
use of employee confidentiality and non-disclosure provisions to protect trade 
secrets).  
 14. Infra Part II.  
 15. Infra Part III.  
 16. Infra Part IV.   
 17. Infra Part V.  
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achievements of players in amateur baseball contests.18 This focus 
on documenting and quantifying the events transpiring on the 
playing field was only natural; as the former president of baseball’s 
National League, John Heydler, once explained: “‘Without records, 
we would have merely a series of exhibitions, meaningless after 
the game was over . . . [. Statistics] give a permanency to the game 
which it could never otherwise enjoy.’”19 
Of the four major North American team sports, statistical and 
data analysis have historically been utilized most prominently in 
professional baseball.20 This is largely due to the fact that the 
performance of individual baseball players is, in many respects, 
easier to accurately quantify than it is for players in the other 
professional sports.21 Much of the action occurring on the playing 
field in baseball is largely attributable to a one-on-one matchup 
between a batter and a pitcher.22 If the batter successfully hits the 
ball and gets on base, he has “won” the matchup; conversely, if the 
pitcher successfully gets the batter out, he is the victor. In contrast, 
quantitatively assessing the performance of basketball, football, 
and hockey players tends to be more difficult, as the performance 
of any one player on any particular play hinges to a great extent 
                                                                                                     
 18. See ALAN SCHWARZ, THE NUMBERS GAME: BASEBALL’S LIFELONG 
FASCINATION WITH STATISTICS 4 (2004) (reporting that “the first primitive 
(baseball) box score—initially termed an ‘abstract’—appeared in the New York 
Morning News on October 22, 1845”); see also Ed Edmonds, Arthur Soden’s 
Legacy: The Origins and Early History of Baseball’s Reserve System, 5 ALBANY 
GOV’T L. REV. 38, 40 (2012) (describing the Cincinnati Red Stockings of 1869 as 
“the first professional baseball team”). 
 19. SCHWARZ, supra note 18, at 25. 
 20. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (describing the origin of sports 
statistics in baseball). 
 21. See ROBERT E. KELLY, BASEBALL’S OFFENSIVE GREATS OF THE DEADBALL 
ERA: BEST PRODUCERS RATED BY POSITION, 1901–1919, at 1 (2009) (“Of all sports, 
baseball is the easiest to quantify.”). 
 22. See Roger Allan Ford, Trade Secrets and Information Security in the Age 
of Sports Analytics, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN SPORTS LAW 4 




088007000119027065097029122121102094088&EXT=pdf (“Baseball is less a team 
game than a series of individual pitcher-hitter encounters, which made it easy to 
develop statistics that predict, rather reliably, the number of runs a team will 
score and the number of games it will win per year.”). 
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not only on the performance of the player in question, but also on 
his or her interactions with four or more teammates working 
together as a single unit on the playing field.23 As a result, due to 
the more individualized nature of its competition, along with its 
status as the continent’s oldest professional sport, baseball has 
traditionally boasted the richest history of statistical and data 
analysis of the four major North American sports.24 
Nevertheless, despite the fact that professional baseball teams 
have had access to a veritable cornucopia of statistical data since 
the industry’s formation, no MLB team went so far as to hire a 
full-time statistician until 1947.25 That year, the Brooklyn 
Dodgers, led by legendary executive Branch Rickey, hired Allan 
Roth to provide the team with novel and proprietary statistical 
analyses.26 Roth began charting every play that the Dodgers were 
involved in that season, allowing him to formulate a series of 
never-before-seen data regarding the performance of the team’s 
players (such as a player’s batting average with runners on base, 
and “spray charts” documenting where each of a particular hitter’s 
batted balls landed).27 The insights that Roth was able to glean 
                                                                                                     
 23. See id. at 5 (“Things become more complicated in sports like basketball 
and football in which the data is more complex and player interactions matter 
more.”). 
 24. See SCHWARZ, supra note 18, at xiv (“No other sport has anywhere near 
such reverence for its statistics.”). 
 25. See id. at 54 (stating that Allan Roth was the “first full-time statistician 
ever hired by a major league club”). 
 26. See id. (noting Allan Roth’s contribution to the major leagues); see also 
Alan Roth, 74, Dies; Baseball Statistician, N.Y. TIMES (March 5, 1992), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/03/05/sports/alan-roth-74-dies-baseball-statistician. 
html (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (“Mr. Rickey was intrigued, and Mr. Roth became 
the first full-time statistician hired by a major league club, touching off a trend 
that has made the personal computer an essential element of clubhouse 
paraphernalia.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); J. Gordon 
Hylton, Why Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption Still Survives, 9 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 
391, 401 (1999) (describing Rickey as a “legendary baseball executive”). Rickey is 
perhaps most famous for signing Jackie Robinson to play for the Dodgers in 1947, 
thereby breaking baseball’s color barrier. See Alfred Dennis Mathewson, Major 
League Baseball’s Monopoly Power and the Negro Leagues, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 291, 
291 (1998) (noting that “Branch Rickey lured Jackie Robinson from the [Negro 
League’s] Kansas City Monarchs to play for the Brooklyn Dodgers”). 
 27.  See, e.g., Bryan Gottlieb, Comment, Avoiding Contractual Liability to 
Baseball Players Who Have Used Performance Enhancing Drugs: Can We Knock 
it Out of the Park?, 77 ALBANY L. REV. 615, 632 (2014) (observing that Allan Roth 
developed a variety of new statistical measurements to assess players’ 
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from this data helped the Dodgers capture the National League 
pennant twice in his first three years with the team.28 
Despite Roth’s contributions, however, other teams were slow 
to follow the Dodgers’ lead and hire their own full-time 
statisticians. In fact, with a few passing exceptions,29 it wasn’t 
until the late-1990s and early-2000s that most MLB teams 
employed their own statistical analysts.30  
In the interim, amateur statisticians from outside of the 
baseball establishment filled the void.31 Led by pioneers like Bill 
James and his fellow members of the Society for American 
Baseball Research (SABR), baseball fans looking to more precisely 
assess the performance and contributions of baseball players and 
teams began to question and challenge the value of traditionally 
relied-on statistics such as batting average, runs batted in (RBIs), 
and pitchers’ win-loss records.32 These efforts—popularly dubbed 
“sabermetrics”—gained momentum in the 1990s, when the 
Internet allowed what had previously been a collection of 
geographically dispersed enthusiasts to more easily collaborate 
with one another electronically.33 Through websites such as 
                                                                                                     
performance).  
 28. See Year-By-Year Results, L.A. DODGERS, http://losangeles. 
dodgers.mlb.com/la/history/year_by_year_results.jsp (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) 
(reporting that the Brooklyn Dodgers finished first in the National League in both 
1947 and 1949) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 29. For instance, the Houston Astros temporarily hired a statistician in 
1979, while the Oakland Athletics employed one in the 1980s. SCHWARZ, supra 
note 18, at 136, 219–20. 
 30. See Brad Millington & Rob Millington, ‘The Datafication of Everything’: 
Toward a Sociology of Sport and Big Data, 32 SOC. SPORT J. 140, 153 (2015) 
(quoting Moneyball author Michael Lewis, “[t]he virus that infected professional 
baseball in the 1990s, the use of statistics to find new and better ways to value 
players and strategies, has found its way into every major sport”). 
 31. See Frankel, supra note 11, at 261–63 (recounting the history of the 
fan-based statistical revolution in professional baseball).  
 32. See Jack Moore, How Wall Street Strangled the Life Out of Sabermetrics, 
VICE SPORTS (Oct. 22, 2014, 8:30 AM), https://sports.vice.com/en_us/article/ 
aem895/how-wall-street-strangled-the-life-out-of-sabermetrics (last visited Sept. 
21, 2017) (finding that “for men like Pete Palmer and Bill James, some of the 
earliest popular sabermetric authors, sabermetrics centered around 
understanding, around reconciling the differences between what they saw on the 
field and how those within baseball said the game was played and won”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 33. See Millington & Millington, supra note 30, at 145 (noting that “it is an 
increasingly accepted premise that computers, together with the drive to know 
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Baseball Prospectus, and later FanGraphs, statistically inclined 
fans created a variety of new metrics to better evaluate the 
performance of baseball players, tools that have subsequently been 
incorporated by professional teams’ in-house statisticians.34  
Sabermetrics was thrust into the mainstream—both within 
the baseball industry and among the public at-large—by the 
publication of Michael Lewis’ best-selling book, Moneyball: The Art 
of Winning an Unfair Game, in 2003.35 Moneyball documented the 
efforts of MLB’s Oakland Athletics, led by the team’s general 
manager, Billy Beane, to challenge the baseball industry’s 
then-conventional wisdom by using sabermetric principles to 
identify and exploit inefficiencies in the way in which most teams 
assessed and valued their players.36 For instance, by targeting 
batters with high on-base percentages37—a trait undervalued by 
most teams at the time—the Athletics were able to build offenses 
that helped propel the team to the playoffs for four straight seasons 
in the early-2000s, all despite the fact that the team boasted one 
of MLB’s lowest player payrolls.38 By recounting this story, 
Moneyball propelled sabermetric principles into the limelight, 
helping introduce the masses to new ways of thinking about the 
sport.39 As a result, practically every team in MLB today utilizes 
sabermetric principles to at least some extent when making 
personnel decisions, often building upon the insights of those 
                                                                                                     
the (consuming) population, have helped spur the arrival of an Age of Big Data” 
in sports). 
 34. See SCHWARZ, supra note 18, at 230–31 (discussing the importance of the 
Baseball Prospectus website in the sabermetrics revolution). 
 35. MICHAEL LEWIS, MONEYBALL: THE ART OF WINNING AN UNFAIR GAME 
(2003). 
 36. See id. at xiv (explaining that “the Oakland A’s general manager, Billy 
Beane, had set about looking for inefficiencies in the game”). 
 37. On-base percentage measures the rate at which a hitter reaches base 
(whether via a hit, walk, or by being hit by a pitch) out of the hitter’s total number 
of plate appearances (i.e., number of times at bat).  
 38. See LEWIS, supra note 31, at 59 (stating that the Athletics’ “corporate 
culture [centered] around a single baseball statistic: on-base percentage”). 
 39. See Frankel, supra note 11, at 263 (stating that “[s]abermetrics was first 
introduced to the non-baseball obsessed through the publication in 2003 of 
Michael Lewis’s best-selling book, Moneyball: The Art of Winning an Unfair 
Game”).  
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working in the public domain to create their own proprietary 
statistical analyses.40 
In contrast to the experience of professional baseball, the other 
major North American sports leagues have generally been slower 
to incorporate their own forms of advanced data analytics.41 That 
being said, the NBA is, by most accounts, the second most 
advanced league when it comes to statistical analysis, with 
professional basketball teams increasingly developing their own 
proprietary methods to look for any possible competitive 
advantage that can be gleaned from newer, more precise statistical 
measurements.42 Meanwhile, although franchises in the NFL and 
NHL generally lag behind their MLB and NBA counterparts when 
it comes to developing their own advanced statistical models,43 
teams in both sports have slowly been making strides in this area 
as well in recent years.44 
                                                                                                     
 40. See SCHWARZ, supra note 18, at 213 (reporting that “by 2002 most major 
league organizations had someone either on staff, or retained as a consultant, to 
conduct sabermetric studies to evaluate players and other moves”); see also Jack 
Moore, Baseball ProGUESTus: The Secret History of Sabermetrics, BASEBALL 
PROSPECTUS (July 16, 2013), http://www.baseballprospectus.com/article.php? 
articleid=21234 (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (concluding that “[e]very major 
league team has established an analytics department, in some form”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 41. See BENJAMIN BAUMER & ANDREW ZIMBALIST, THE SABERMETRIC 
REVOLUTION: ASSESSING THE GROWTH OF ANALYTICS IN BASEBALL, at xii (2013) 
(claiming that it is “not surprising that since its early days, baseball has produced 
a copious quantitative record” as compared to other sports). 
 42. See, e.g., Scott Bukstein, A New Solution for Salary Disputes: 
Implementing Salary Arbitration in the National Basketball Association, 22 
MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 25, 32 (2011) (noting the “increasing use of analytics and 
sabermetrics for player and team performance in basketball”); see also Ehran 
Khan, Advanced NBA Stats for Dummies: How to Understand the New Hoops 
Math, BLEACHER REP. (Oct. 18, 2013), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/ 
1813902-advanced-nba-stats-for-dummies-how-to-understand-the-new-hoops-mat
h (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (summarizing the most popular advanced statistics 
being used in the NBA) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 43. See, e.g., Kevin Clark, The NFL’s Brewing Information War, RINGER 
(June 2, 2016, 1:13 PM), https://www.theringer.com/2016/6/2/16077478/nfl-
information-war-data-advanced-stats-73b6eee2d39f (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) 
(finding that NFL teams generally lag “behind other professional leagues amid 
an otherwise widespread analytics revolution”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 44. For a brief overview of the use of advanced statistics in the NFL, see 
Methods to Our Madness, FOOTBALL OUTSIDERS, http://www.football 
outsiders.com/info/methods (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (discussing a plethora of 
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The use of data and statistical analysis in the sports industry 
is only likely to continue to grow in the future, as new technologies 
enable teams in all four leagues to assess their players’ 
performance in previously unimaginable ways.45 Over the past few 
years, for instance, each of the four major North American sports 
leagues have begun to implement new systems that, through the 
use of intricate series of cameras and sensors, allow teams to track 
and record every event that transpires on the playing field in much 
more precise detail than ever before.46 In MLB, for example, the 
league’s new StatCast system not only records players’ every 
movement on the field, but also tracks the flight of the baseball 
itself, including both the number of times the ball rotates after 
being thrown by a pitcher, and the velocity and angle with which 
it leaves a hitter’s bat.47 Similarly, in the NFL, all players were 
fitted with special shoulder pads for the 2015 season that included 
two tiny computer chips, allowing a series of receivers located 
throughout the stadium to continuously record each player’s 
location and movement.48 The copious amounts of data produced 
                                                                                                     
advanced statistics in football) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
Similarly, for an overview of the emerging use of advanced statistics in 
professional hockey, see Sam Page, Fancy Stats Primer: Your Guide to Hockey’s 
Advanced Analytics Jargon, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Sept. 29, 2014), 
https://www.si.com/nhl/2014/09/28/fancy-stats-primer-advanced-analytics-corsi-
fenwick-pdo-qualcomp (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (overviewing how to 
meaningfully breakdown and understand hockey statistics) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 45. See Millington & Millington, supra note 30, at 156 (predicting that “with 
the advent of technologies . . . with the steady ‘flow’ of analysts, investors, and 
ideas” in Big Data in sports, “the volume and variety of data” will only continue 
to grow). 
 46. See, e.g., Christian Frodl, Commercialisation of Sports Data: Rights of 
Event Owners Over Information and Statistics Generated About Their Sports 
Events, 26 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 55, 62 (2015) (observing that “[t]he National 
Basketball Association (NBA) announced an agreement with STATS in 2013 to 
install player-tracking systems at all NBA games”). 
 47. See Ben Lindbergh, Ready, Set, Statcast: What the New Data Stream Can 
Teach Us About MLB, GRANTLAND (April 9, 2015), https://grantland.com/the-
triangle/mlb-2015-statcast-advanced-hitting-pitching-defensive-stats/?print=1 
(last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (explaining that StatCast “captur[es] the physical 
position of every player, pitch, and batted ball many times per second”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 48. See Clark, supra note 43 (noting that the NFL’s tracking system 
“decipher[s] all movements on the field, measuring everything from player speed 
to how open a pass-catcher manages to get on a given play”). 
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by these new tracking systems promise to yield untold new 
insights into each of the four major sports, and thus represents a 
potentially significant source of competitive advantage for the 
teams that are best able to develop proprietary methods for 
analyzing this new information and incorporate it into their 
decision-making processes.49 
At the same time, teams across the professional sports 
industry are also beginning to make use of new biometric-tracking 
technology, enabling them to monitor their players 
physiologically.50 Through the use of Fitbits and similar devices, 
for instance, teams can now measure the number of calories their 
players consume and burn in a given day, their heart rate during 
practice and games, and even the amount and quality of their sleep 
each night.51 Meanwhile, other new technologies such as Motus 
sensors enable teams to view, in real-time, the amount of stress 
that athletes are placing on their various joints and tendons, 
especially those that are most susceptible to injury.52 The data 
gleaned from these sorts of biometric tracking devices represents 
another source of potential competitive advantage for teams, 
allowing them to fine-tune dietary and physical training regimens 
to help their players avoid injury and achieve peak physical 
performance on the playing field.53 
                                                                                                     
 49. See Robert C. Bird, Law, Strategy, and Competitive Advantage, 44 CONN. 
L. REV. 61, 63 (2011) (stating that “[f]irms continuously seek a competitive 
advantage over rivals”).  
 50. See Watt, supra note 10 (discussing the use of biometric-tracking 
technology in professional baseball).   
 51. See id. (observing same); see also Steven I. Friedland, Of Clouds and 
Clocks: Police Location Tracking in the Digital Age, 48 TEX. TECH L. REV. 165, 167 
(2015) (explaining that Fitbit devices “track[] a person’s everyday health and 
fitness”). 
 52. See The Associated Press, Putting Data Science on a Player’s Sleeve, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/03/sports/baseball/putting-
data-science-on-a-players-sleeve.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (reporting that 
through the use of “five blue sensors attached” to a player’s body, Motus sensors 
“record[] 39 sets of measurements, including shoulder rotation, hip speed and 
stride”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 53. See Robert Guthrie, The Future of Biometric Tracking Will Make Step 
Counters Look Like Antiques, DIGITAL TRENDS (Dec. 13, 2016, 4:30 PM), 
https://www.digitaltrends.com/health-fitness/future-of-biometrics-beyond-the-
wrist-tracker/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (claiming that advances in biometric 
technology “offer the opportunity to find out exactly what your body is capable of, 
helping customers truly fine-tune their fitness, nutrition, and general 
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In addition to advanced statistical and data analysis, sports 
franchises also derive value from more traditional forms of 
proprietary information. For instance, many teams closely guard 
their playbooks—compilations of all of their strategies and plays—
along with the various signals (hand, verbal, or otherwise) used by 
coaches to relay play calls to players during a game.54 Similarly, 
scouting reports regarding the strengths and weaknesses of both a 
franchise’s own players, as well as those playing for opposing 
teams, are another type of information that clubs may wish to 
protect, as are records documenting a franchise’s prior and 
on-going trade negotiations with other clubs.55 Meanwhile, like 
any business, a professional sports team is also likely to possess 
proprietary information relating to its general business plans, 
marketing strategies, and customer lists, all of which will also 
usually be of commercial value.56 As with newer, more advanced 
forms of statistical and data analysis, each of these types of 
proprietary information represent another source of potential 
competitive advantage for sports teams.57 
Lest there were any doubt regarding the value that sports 
franchises place on these various forms of proprietary information, 
those questions were largely laid to rest in June 2015, when news 
                                                                                                     
well-being”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 54. See Rice Ferrelle, Note, Combating the Lure of Impropriety in 
Professional Sports Industries: The Desirability of Treating a Playbook as a 
Legally Enforceable Trade Secret, 11 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 149, 150 (2003) (“In the 
NFL, playbooks are treated like trade secrets.”); see also Samuel J. Horovitz, If 
You Ain’t Cheating You Ain’t Trying: “Spygate” and the Legal Implications of 
Trying Too Hard, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 305, 315–16 (2009) (describing the 
lengths teams will go to  protect their playbooks). 
 55. See Nat’l Football Scouting, Inc. v. Rang, 912 F. Supp. 2d 985, 995–96 
(W.D. Wash. 2012) (concluding that scouting reports of players’ abilities are 
potentially protectable under trade secret law); see also Matthew J. Frankel, 
Hackers Strike Out: Recent Cases of Alleged Sports Analytics IP Theft, 1 J. SPORTS 
ANALYTICS 83, 84 (2015) (noting the sensitivity of a “team’s confidential 
player-evaluation programs”). 
 56. See Anne M. Wall, Sports Marketing and the Law: Protecting Proprietary 
Interests in Sports Entertainment Events, 7 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 77, 138 (1996) 
(observing that “[b]usiness plans, marketing strategies, formal game plans, 
technical information, financial data, and customer lists” are all potentially 
valuable commercial information for a sports team). 
 57. See id. at 137 (noting that “[d]isclosure of a company’s know-how and 
trade secrets to competitors or to the public could result in a loss of the company’s 
competitive advantage”). 
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reports emerged that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
was investigating whether officials from MLB’s St. Louis 
Cardinals had illegally accessed, or hacked into, an internal 
computer network belonging to their league rival, the Houston 
Astros.58 The government had launched its investigation nearly a 
year earlier, after notes memorializing the Astros’ trade 
discussions with other clubs were taken from the team’s network—
whimsically named “Ground Control”—and leaked to the sports 
website Deadspin.59 While the FBI’s investigation into the incident 
remains ongoing, to date one former member of the Cardinals’ 
front office staff, Christopher Correa, the team’s then-scouting 
director, has pled guilty to charges that he illegally accessed the 
Astros’ internal network in order to view the team’s proprietary 
information (including Houston’s player scouting reports and 
statistical analyses, in addition to the leaked trade-discussion 
notes).60  
This incident highlights the growing importance of 
proprietary data in the professional team sports industry, and thus 
illustrates the need for sports franchises to take measures to 
secure and legally protect their most valuable and sensitive 
information.61  
                                                                                                     
 58. See Michael S. Schmidt, Cardinals Investigated for Hacking Into Astros’ 
Database, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2015, at A1 (“Investigators have uncovered 
evidence that Cardinals employees broke into a network of the Astros that 
housed special databases the team had built” and “[i]nternal discussions about 
trades, proprietary statistics and scouting reports were compromised.”). 
 59. See Barry Petchesky, Leaked: 10 Months Of The Houston Astros’ Internal 
Trade Talks, DEADSPIN (June 30, 2014, 1:19 PM), http://deadspin.com/leaked-10-
months-of-the-houston-astros-internal-trade-1597951970 (last visited Sept. 21, 
2017) (“Documents purportedly taken from Ground Control and showing 10 
months’ worth of the Astros’ internal trade chatter have been posted online 
at . . . a site where users can anonymously share hacked or leaked information.”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 60. See Plea Agreement at 10, United States v. Correa, Case No. 
4:15-CR-00679 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2016), ECF. No. 15 (recounting that Correa 
accessed the Astros’ evaluations of current and prospective players, the team’s 
ongoing statistical analysis projects, and trade discussions). On July 18, 2016, 
Judge Lynn Hughes of the Southern District of Texas sentenced Correa to 
forty-six months in jail and ordered him to pay the Astros $279,038 in restitution 
for his unauthorized access of the team’s computer network. Associated Press, 
Ex-Cardinals Official Gets Nearly Four Years for Hacking, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 
2016, at B10. 
 61. Indeed, in the aftermath of the Cardinals-Astros’ hacking affair, MLB 
has reportedly encouraged its teams to take greater steps—including the 
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III. The Law of Trade Secrets in the United States and Canada 
As noted above, firms within both the professional sports 
industry and the economy at-large most frequently rely on the law 
of trade secrets to protect their data analysis and related forms of 
proprietary information.62 This is true for several reasons. First, it 
is questionable whether much of this sort of information would 
qualify for protection under other forms of intellectual property 
law.63 Second, even if it did, proving the unauthorized use of a 
proprietary method of data analysis, for example, would be nearly 
impossible, since any infringing activities would usually be carried 
out behind closed doors without producing any readily discernible 
evidence of the infringement. Therefore, to the extent that a North 
American professional sports team wishes to legally protect its 
proprietary data, trade secrecy law will often prove to be its only 
practical option. 
Consequently, an overview of the law of trade secrets is in 
order. This Part, therefore, provides a summary of the current 
state of trade secrecy law in both the United States and Canada 
(the latter of which currently houses teams in three of the four 
major North American sports leagues). 
A. United States 
In contrast to the constitutional underpinnings of patent and 
copyright law, American trade secrecy law has evolved from the 
common law.64 As the labor market shifted in the 1800s from an 
                                                                                                     
modernization of their employment contracts—to protect their intellectual 
property. See Derrick Goold, MLB Commissioner: Teams Need to Protect 
Intellectual Property, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Nov. 10, 2015), 
http://www.stltoday.com/sports/baseball/professional/birdland/mlb-commissioner- 
teams-need-to-protect-intellectual-property/article_4c2ed647-65e6-5edd-b17a-
e3cdcf510fd3.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (reporting same) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 62. See supra note 11 (discussing the fact that data analysis methods are 
most commonly protected under trade secret law). 
 63. See, e.g., Mattioli, supra note 11, at 553–55 (observing that “[a]lgorithms 
that amount to abstract ideas, for instance, do not meet the threshold eligibility 
requirements for patent protection,” while “copyright protection does not provide 
exclusivity in processes or methods”). 
 64. See Michael Risch, Why Do We Have Trade Secrets?, 11 MARQ. INTELL. 
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apprenticeship model to greater industrialization, 
nineteenth-century American courts began to recognize ownership 
in confidential business information, importing common law 
doctrines established during the English Industrial Revolution.65  
In an effort to summarize and harmonize the growing body of 
state laws on trade secrecy, the American Law Institute included 
the topic in its Restatement (First) of Torts (Restatement), 
published in 1939.66 The Restatement defined a trade secret as 
“any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which 
is used in one’s business, and which gives [the business] an 
opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not 
know or use it.”67 In addition, it required that secrecy was needed 
in order for the confidential information to receive legal 
protection.68 For liability to arise for the misappropriation of a 
trade secret, however, the Restatement specified that the 
                                                                                                     
PROP. L. REV. 1, 6 (2007) (“Whereas copyright and patent law in the United States 
find legal justification in the Constitution and implementing federal statutes, 
trade secret law grew out of the common law and has now been codified separately 
in most states.”). 
 65. See Vickery v. Welch, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 523, 525 (1837) (citing English 
case law, this is the first reported U.S. case involving the protection of a trade 
secret, specifically the method of making chocolate); see also Benjamin A. 
Emmert, Comment, Keeping Confidence with Former Employees: California 
Courts Apply the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine to California Trade Secret Law, 
40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1171, 1174 (2000) (noting early American reliance on 
nineteenth-century English trade secret case law). 
 66. David S. Almeling, Seven Reasons Why Trade Secrets are Increasingly 
Important, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1091, 1096 (2012) (“When the Restatement of 
Torts was published in 1939, it included a section summarizing the law of trade 
secrets.”). 
 67. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1939); see also 
Christopher B. Seaman, The Case Against Federalizing Trade Secrecy, 101 VA. L. 
REV. 317, 325 (2015) (describing the history and content of the trade secrecy 
provisions of the Restatement (First) of Torts). Notably, the Restatement also 
failed to protect negative information, i.e., knowledge about how not to do 
something, as well as “single use” information lacking a continuous business use. 
See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (stating that a trade secret 
“differs from other secret information in business in that it is not simply 
information as to single or ephemeral events in the conduct of business”); see also 
Risch, supra note 64, at 8 (noting the Restatement’s more restrictive definition of 
a trade secret, excepting “single use” information); Emmert, supra note 65, at 
1176–77 (observing the failure of the Restatement to protect negative information 
and information with a “short life span, such as a contract for sale or a marketing 
plan”). 
 68. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b. 
PROTECTING BIG DATA IN THE BIG LEAGUES 1583 
information must have either been discovered by “improper 
means,” or else disclosed or used in breach of a duty of confidence.69 
Although the Restatement was frequently cited by courts, “due to 
[its] nonbinding nature . . . trade secret law remained 
geographically inconsistent, developing unevenly from state to 
state.”70 
In an attempt to overcome this geographic inconsistency, trade 
secret law in the United States was eventually codified in three 
primary statutes: the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), the 
Economic Espionage Act (EEA), and—most recently—the Defend 
Trade Secrets Act (DTSA).71 This subpart reviews each of these 
three statutory provisions in turn. 
1. Uniform Trade Secrets Act 
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws attempted to address the shortcomings of the Restatement 
by “codify[ing] existing common law standards and . . . provid[ing] 
a uniform approach to trade secret misappropriation among the 
states” through its enactment of the UTSA in 1979.72 Today, 
forty-eight states and the District of Columbia have adopted some 
version of the UTSA.73 Meanwhile, despite not having formally 
enacted the UTSA themselves, both of the two outlier states—New 
                                                                                                     
 69. Id. § 757(a)–(b). 
 70. Almeling, supra note 66, at 1096–97. 
 71. See generally BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RES. SERV., PROTECTION OF TRADE 
SECRETS: OVERVIEW OF CURRENT LAW AND LEGISLATION (2016), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/R43714.pdf (summarizing the current law and 
legislation governing trade secrets in the United States). 
 72. Christopher Rebel J. Pace, The Case for a Federal Trade Secrets Act, 8 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 427, 432–33 (1995). 
 73. See Latest Updates on Federal Trade Secrets Legislation, SEYFARTH 
SHAW, http://www.tradesecretslaw.com/latest-update-on-federal-trade-secret-
legislation/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (noting that Texas is the most recent 
adoptee of the UTSA with the two holdout states, Massachusetts and New York, 
adhering to the common law) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); 
see also Seaman, supra note 67, at 330 (noting that the Restatement (Third) of 
Unfair Competition, promulgated in 1995, generally mirrors the provisions of the 
UTSA and “has had only a modest impact at best on the development of trade 
secret law”). 
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York and Massachusetts—impose similar requirements in order 
for trade secret protection to arise.74  
Specifically, in order to establish a claim for misappropriation 
of a trade secret under the UTSA, a plaintiff must show that (1) a 
legally protectable trade secret exists; and (2) the defendant 
acquired the trade secret by improper means.75  
a. Existence of a Trade Secret 
As to the first requirement, the UTSA defines a trade secret 
as:  
[I]nformation, including a formula, pattern, compilation, 
program, device, method, technique, or process, that: (i) derives 
independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being 
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by 
proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value 
from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that 
are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its 
secrecy.76  
Parsing this language, the UTSA requires two elements to 
establish the existence of a trade secret.  
First, a plaintiff must be able to show that its trade secret 
possesses economic value from not being “generally known.”77 
Under this standard, courts have held that information has 
economic value if a competitor would have to expend time and 
money to independently discover the information and would 
materially benefit from its discovery.78 Meanwhile, a trade secret 
                                                                                                     
 74. See Frankel, supra note 11, at 252 (reporting that the states that have 
not yet adopted the UTSA nevertheless impose similar standards on parties 
seeking to protect their trade secrets). However, it should be noted that even in 
states that have adopted the UTSA, some courts nonetheless “continue to invoke 
principles from cases decided under the First Restatement of Torts.” Geraldine 
Szott Moohr, The Problematic Role of Criminal Law in Regulating Use of 
Information: The Case of the Economic Espionage Act, 80 N.C. L. REV. 853, 871 
(2002). 
 75. See, e.g., Marina Lao, Federalizing Trade Secrets Law in an Information 
Economy, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1633, 1653 (1998) (defining the scope of the term “trade 
secret” under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act). 
 76. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1996). 
 77. Id. 
 78. See John H. Matheson, Employee Beware: The Irreparable Damage of the 
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is not generally known so long as it has not “escap[ed] into the 
mainstream of public knowledge.”79 Along these lines, “absolute 
secrecy” is not required.80 Instead, a trade secret may properly be 
“shared with employees, independent contractors, [or] third-party 
business partners” without losing its legal protection, so long as 
these individuals have a need to know the information and are 
made aware of its confidentiality.81 
Second, a plaintiff must also be able to show that it has taken 
reasonable measures to maintain the secrecy of its proprietary 
information in order for a legally protectable trade secret to exist 
under the UTSA.82 This is a fact-specific inquiry.83 Courts in this 
respect often engage in a cost-benefit analysis, balancing the 
necessity of a company taking adequate precautions to protect its 
trade secrets against concerns that these measures not be unduly 
burdensome.84 Indeed, many courts view the efforts to maintain 
secrecy as a function of the value of the underlying trade secret. In 
other words, “[s]ome courts may reason that there is a direct 
                                                                                                     
Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine, 10 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 145, 148 (1998) 
(explaining how courts define whether information is generally known). 
 79. JAMES POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS § 4.04(2)(a) (2011). 
 80. Elizabeth A. Rowe, Contributory Negligence, Technology, and Trade 
Secrets, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 9 (2009) (observing that it is well established 
that “reasonable efforts do not require absolute secrecy”); see, e.g., Sheets v. 
Yamaha Motors Corp., 849 F.2d 179, 183 (5th Cir. 1988) (explaining relative 
secrecy under Louisiana law). 
 81. Frankel, supra note 11, at 253. 
 82. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(ii) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1996). 
 83. See Rowe, supra note 80, at 2 (“This [reasonable measures] standard is 
very flexible, and intuitively necessitates a fact-intensive case-by-case 
determination that considers a host of factors in trying to ascertain 
reasonableness.”). 
 84. See id. at 9 
These decisions necessitate a balancing between using sufficient 
precautions to protect a company’s secret on the one hand, while not 
imposing overly-burdensome precautions that would impair the 
functioning of its business on the other hand. The inquiry necessarily 
calls for a cost-benefit analysis, which varies in each case based on the 
costs of the protective measures relative to the attendant benefits of 
protecting the information.  
POOLEY, supra note 79, at § 4.04(2)(b); see also Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV 
Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 179 (7th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he answer [to what is 
reasonable to maintain secrecy] depends on a balancing of costs and benefits that 
will vary from case to case and so require estimation and measurement by persons 
knowledgeable in the particular field of endeavor involved.”). 
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relationship between the value of the information and the extent 
to which the company made efforts to protect it such that the more 
valuable the information to the company, the more costly or 
extensive the measures ought to be to protect it.”85 
Ultimately, a company need not undertake “‘[h]eroic’ efforts” 
to protect the secrecy of its trade secrets.86 Instead, examples of 
sufficient reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy may include 
electronic surveillance, computer passwords, and physical 
measures to secure or lock the information.87 Among the many 
potential tools for maintaining secrecy at a company’s disposal, two 
of the most commonly used tend to be requiring employees to sign 
(1) a non-disclosure or confidentiality agreement (NDA) and/or 
(2) a non-compete agreement.88 
2. Non-Disclosure Agreements 
One way that a company can establish that it is taking 
reasonable measures to protect its trade secrets is the use of an 
NDA.89 An NDA is often included as part of an employment or 
independent contractor agreement, and typically specifies: “(1) a 
description of the information to be held in confidence; (2) a bar 
against the use of such information on behalf of oneself or a third 
party; (3) a bar against disclosure of such information to a third 
                                                                                                     
 85. Rowe, supra note 80, at 10. 
 86. Frankel, supra note 11, at 253. 
 87. See Rowe, supra note 80, at 11 
The language the courts use is not always consistent, but courts often 
look for the use of the following kinds of security measures in assessing 
reasonableness: (1) confidentiality agreements; (2) exit interviews 
reminding departing employees of their confidentiality obligations; 
(3) security badges to enter the premises or secured areas; (4) security 
guards and closed-circuit television cameras; and (5) computer 
passwords or access codes restricting access to certain personnel. 
 88. See, e.g., Tim McInturf & Tim Rybacki, Keeping Your Secrets Secret: An 
Employer’s Primer on Trade Secret Protection, Noncompetition Agreements, and 
Unfair Competition in Texas, 44 TEX. J. BUS. L. 233, 244–45 (describing 
non-disclosure and non-compete provisions as “reasonable steps” to be taken to 
“keep the trade secrets substantially secret”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 89. See Alan J. Tracey, The Contract in the Trade Secret Ballroom—A 
Forgotten Dance Partner?, 16 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 47, 63 (2007) (noting “one of 
the most commonly used and well-recognized approaches to safeguarding the 
access of trade secret information is a confidentiality agreement”). 
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party; and (4) a requirement to obtain the employer’s 
authorization before making any such use or disclosure.”90 While 
the use of an NDA is not dispositive, in and of itself, in establishing 
that reasonable measures have been taken to protect a trade 
secret, many view NDAs as constituting “the core of trade secret 
[protection],” helping to “fundamentally define the nature of the 
information as valuable.”91 Thus, the lack of an NDA may cut 
against a finding of reasonable measures to establish secrecy 
unless the trade secret owner has undertaken other sufficient 
precautions.92  
States adopt varying approaches when scrutinizing the 
enforceability of NDAs. While some courts only enforce 
“reasonable” NDAs, other courts do not require NDAs to contain 
reasonable limitations.93 Even among courts engaging in a 
reasonableness analysis, there is no uniform approach to the 
definition of reasonable.94 Nonetheless, these courts generally 
consider nondisclosure covenants reasonable, and thus 
enforceable, if they contain temporal, geographical, and/or 
scope-of-activity limitations, as appropriate under the 
circumstances.95 In addition, like any contract, courts may elect 
not to enforce an NDA if it is unconscionable or contrary to public 
policy objectives of “fostering socially valuable activities, such as 
                                                                                                     
 90. Frankel, supra note 11, at 279. 
 91. POOLEY, supra note 79, at § 8.02[2]. In addition, an NDA also provides 
the added benefit of giving “the employer a claim for breach of contract, in 
addition to a claim for misappropriation” of a trade secret. Frankel, supra note 
11, at 278. 
 92. See Tracey, supra note 89, at 68 (“Of course, the lack of a confidentiality 
agreement will not eliminate trade secret protection in all cases if the trade secret 
owner takes other significant steps to safeguard the information.”). 
 93. Compare Carol M. Bast, At What Price Silence: Are Confidentiality 
Agreements Enforceable?, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 627, 639 (1999) (noting that 
Michigan, Georgia, Illinois, South Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Virginia only 
enforce reasonable NDAs), with Zep Mfg. Co. v. Harthcock, 824 S.W.2d 654, 663 
(Tex. App. Dallas 1992) (concluding that unlike a non-compete agreement, in 
Texas there is no requirement that NDAs be reasonable to be enforceable). 
 94. See Bast, supra note 93, at 639 (“What is reasonable varies from state to 
state.”). 
 95. See, e.g., id. at 640–41 (describing the reasonableness standards for 
enforceability of NDAs in Illinois, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania). 
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an employee proving employment discrimination or protecting 
whistleblowers.”96  
3. Non-Compete Agreements 
Another increasingly popular,97 albeit controversial,98 
means of protecting trade secrets is the use of non-compete clauses 
in an employment agreement. In other words, by imposing 
restrictions on a departing employee’s ability to work in a 
particular field and/or location for a certain time period, the 
employer all but ensures that the former employee will not have 
an opportunity to utilize or disclose any of its trade secrets.99 Some 
commentators note that in addition to being a reasonable measure 
to protect the secrecy of a trade secret, non-competes also 
effectively function as an alternative regime to trade secret law, 
enabling employers to preemptively prevent any trade secret 
misappropriation without the formalities of establishing a UTSA 
violation.100  
                                                                                                     
 96. Norman D. Bishara & David Orozco, Using the Resource-Based Theory 
to Determine Covenant Not to Compete Legitimacy, 87 IND. L.J. 979, 988 (2012). 
 97. See THE WHITE HOUSE, NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS: ANALYSIS OF THE 
USAGE, POTENTIAL ISSUES, AND STATE RESPONSE 3 (2016), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/non-competes_report_ 
final2.pdf (“Research suggests that 18 percent, or 30 million, American workers 
are currently covered by non-compete agreements.”). 
 98. See id. at 5 (citing evidence that “noncompetes . . . hamper the efficiency 
of the economy as a whole by depressing wages, limiting mobility, and inhibiting 
innovation”). 
 99. See Michael J. Garrison & John T. Wendt, The Evolving Law of Employee 
Noncompete Agreements: Recent Trends and an Alternative Policy Approach, 45 
AM. BUS. L.J. 107, 117 (2008) (“In the protection of trade secrets, noncompete 
agreements are used as a means of minimizing the potential for trade secret 
misappropriation by preventing an employee from working for a competitor or 
engaging in a competing enterprise.”). 
 100. See Frankel, supra note 11, at 281 (arguing that “[i]f any former 
employee cannot work for the competition, he is unlikely to hand over his former 
employer’s trade secrets; and if the former employee attempts to do so, [he can be 
stopped without] the ‘challenge and uncertainty of litigation to prove trade 
secret’”); see also Garrison & Wendt, supra note 98, at 117 (recognizing the 
preventative nature of a non-compete, which “allows employers to prevent any 
improper use of trade secrets before it occurs rather than responding to a 
misappropriation, when the harm (which may be significant) is done”); Charles 
Tait Graves, Analyzing the Non-Competition Covenant as a Category of 
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Nonetheless, courts place limitations on the enforceability of 
non-competes.101 While only two states, California102 and North 
Dakota,103 generally prohibit non-competes outright, the 
remaining states typically employ a reasonableness test in 
assessing the enforceability of a non-compete agreement.104 
Although states have adopted various tests guided by either a state 
statute or common law development,105 a common standard 
considers a non-compete reasonable, and thus enforceable, if it is 
“necessary to protect a legitimate business interest, reasonably 
                                                                                                     
Intellectual Property Regulation, 3 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 69, 76 (2011) 
(observing that “although courts tell us that the non-competition agreement 
functions as an alternative type of trade secret regulation, it is a curious 
alternative, seemingly free of the procedural and substantive safeguards found in 
the official law of [trade secrets]”). 
 101. See 104 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 393 (“Many states have provided by 
statute that covenants not to compete are void entirely or permitted with limited 
exceptions. If a covenant not to compete is statutorily permitted, many courts will 
only enforce the covenant if it is reasonable in its time and geographic 
restrictions.”). 
 102. See Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology 
Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 607 (1999) (“Other than two statutory exceptions (which track 
the general rule outside of California) allowing enforcement of covenants not to 
compete associated with the sale of a business, the [California] statute’s 
prohibition [against non-competes] is essentially unqualified.”). 
 103. See Viva R. Moffat, Making Non-Competes Unenforceable, 54 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 939, 945 (2012) (noting that North Dakota only allows non-competes in 
connection with the sale of a business or dissolution of a partnership).   
 104. See Norman D. Bishara & Michelle Westermann-Behaylo, The Law and 
Ethics of Restrictions on an Employee’s Post-Employment Mobility, 49 AM. BUS. 
L.J. 1, 17 (2012) (“In the vast majority of jurisdictions that do enforce 
noncompetes, courts will use a reasonableness test.”); see also Norman D. 
Bishara, Fifty Ways to Leave Your Employer: Relative Enforcement of Covenants 
Not to Compete, Trends, and Implications for Employee Mobility Policy, 13 U. PA. 
J. BUS. L. 751, 758 (2011) (“Whatever consensus exists among the enforcing states 
has coalesced around a reasonableness test that balances the rights of parties to 
the restrictive covenant while assessing the effect on the public interest.”); Moffat, 
supra note 103, at 943, 948–49 (contending that despite “the fact that a majority 
of states apply some version of this ‘reasonableness’ approach, there is hardly 
uniformity or predictability even among those states” and further detailing the 
“wide state-to-state variation in the treatment of non-compete provisions”). 
 105. See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Leaky Covenants-Not-To-Compete As The 
Legal Infrastructure For Innovation, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 251, 262 n.37 (2015) 
(observing that states either address non-competes through common law or a 
statute (citing BRIAN M. MALSBERGER, COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE, A 
STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY (4th ed. 2004 & Supp. 2014))).  
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limited in time and space, and consonant with the public 
interest.”106 This approach is similar to the standard set forth in 
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts regarding the enforceability 
of non-competes, which balances the employer’s need to protect 
legitimate interests against the harm to the employee and 
public.107 
Protecting trade secrets generally satisfies the legitimate 
business interest requirement for the enforceability of a 
non-compete,108 while the reasonableness of the duration and 
geography restraints is a more fact-specific inquiry.109 When 
analyzing the reasonableness of a geographic limitation, for 
instance, courts will generally “uphold a restriction on competition 
that is coextensive with the area where the [former employer] is 
doing business.”110 Non-competes have been upheld, for example, 
when limited to a certain state or geographic radius from the 
former employer.111 Meanwhile, in terms of durational restraints, 
                                                                                                     
 106. Bishara & Orozco, supra note 96, at 758 (citing a Massachusetts 
standard); see also Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 173 F.3d 63, 69 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(“The issue of whether a restrictive covenant not to compete is enforceable by way 
of an injunction depends in the first place upon whether the covenant is 
reasonable in time and geographic area.”). 
 107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 (AM. LAW. INST. 1981); see 
also Moffat, supra note 103, at 947–48 (noting that New York and Virginia, among 
other jurisdictions, follow a similar balancing test in line with the Restatement). 
 108. See Garrison & Wendt, supra note 99, at 116 (“Traditionally, the courts 
recognized two primary interests as legitimate justifications for a noncompete 
agreement: the employer’s interests in protecting the goodwill of the business and 
in protecting its trade secrets.”). 
 109. See NDSL, Inc. v. Patnoude, 914 F. Supp. 2d 885, 891 (W.D. Mich. 2012) 
(discussing six different factors the court considers when evaluating the 
reasonableness of a territorial restriction in a covenant not to compete). 
 110. Liautaud v. Liautaud, 221 F.3d 981, 988 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 111. See Thomas M. Hogan, Uncertainty in the Employment Context: Which 
Types of Restrictive Covenants are Enforceable?, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 429, 443 
(2006) (citing Safety-Kleen Sys., Inc. v. Hennkens, 301 F.3d 931, 934, 937 (8th 
Cir. 2002)) (enforcing a non-compete restricting competition within the state); see 
also Ticor Title Ins. Co., 173 F.3d at 66, 73 (upholding a non-compete that 
prohibited a salesman from competing in the state of New York); A.N. Deringer, 
Inc. v. Strough, 103 F.3d 243, 244–45, 249 (2d Cir. 1996) (allowing a non-compete 
restricting competition to a one-hundred-mile radius in Vermont). But see Nat’l 
Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Newman, 577 S.W.2d 99, 104–05 (Mo. App. 1978) 
(enforcing a two-year customer non-solicitation clause with no geographic 
limitation that was limited to customers with whom the employee dealt); Angie 
Davis, Eric D. Reicin & Marisa Warren, Developing Trends in Non-Compete 
Agreements and Other Restrictive Covenants, 30 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 255, 256 
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courts often consider a time limit of two years or less to be 
reasonable,112 with “six months to one year being quite common 
and ordinarily within the range of reasonableness.”113  
If a non-compete contains unreasonable terms—e.g., is found 
to contain an overbroad geographic or durational restraint—courts 
employ varying approaches to its enforceability. In a majority of 
states, courts will reform the non-compete to be compliant with 
state law.114 However, courts in some states will void the 
non-compete in its entirety if any provision is unreasonable (the 
so-called “red pencil” approach), while other courts will strike (or 
“blue pencil”) the unreasonable terms but enforce the remaining 
provisions provided they are grammatically correct.115  
In addition, courts require that an employer provide adequate 
contractual consideration to the employee to support a 
non-compete agreement.116 If a non-compete is entered into at the 
inception of employment, the promise of a job is usually deemed 
sufficient consideration.117 However, if the non-compete is 
                                                                                                     
(2015) (“With respect to the reasonableness of geographic limitations, an evolving 
issue is whether a customer restriction may substitute for a geographic 
limitation.”). 
 112. See Davis, Reicin & Warren, supra note 111, at 263 (“In general, 
[non-compete] agreements extending beyond one or two years are scrutinized 
more closely, particularly when the sale of a business is not involved.”); see also 
Hogan, supra note 111, at 454 (noting cases upholding a two year non-compete 
durational threshold). 
 113. Garrison & Wendt, supra note 108, at 186 n.45. But see EarthWeb, Inc. 
v. Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d 299, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (refusing to enforce the 
one-year duration of a non-compete because it was “too long given the dynamic 
nature of this [information technology] industry [and] its lack of geographical 
borders”). 
 114. See THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 97, at 11 (explaining the three main 
approaches to unenforceable non-competes, and noting that a majority of states 
will reform or rewrite the non-compete to make it compliant with the law); see 
also Moffat, supra note 103, at 950 (describing the partial enforcement or 
reformation approach).  
 115. See Moffat, supra note 99, at 949–50 (detailing how courts implement 
the red and blue pencil doctrines). 
 116. See Mark B. Wessman, Retaining the Gatekeeper: Further Reflections on 
the Doctrine of Consideration, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 713, 795 (1996) (describing the 
consideration required when non-compete clauses are included in employment 
contracts). 
 117. See id.  
In most cases if an employee agrees, at the time the employment 
relationship commences, that upon termination he or she will not 
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negotiated during the midst of a preexisting employment 
relationship, some states will require additional consideration, 
apart from continued employment (e.g., a promotion), to enforce 
the non-compete.118 
a. Misappropriation or Acquiring a Trade Secret by 
Improper Means 
Assuming that the plaintiff can establish the existence of a 
legally protectable trade secret, one must also prove that that 
information has been misappropriated in order to recover under 
the UTSA.119 Notably, one need not show that the defendant has 
actually used the misappropriated trade secret, as the UTSA 
authorizes injunctive relief merely upon a defendant’s improper 
acquisition of the protected information.120 Indeed, 
misappropriation of a trade secret can occur by either: 
(1) acquiring a trade secret by improper means; or (2) knowingly 
disclosing or using a trade secret acquired by improper means.121 
The UTSA includes a catalogue of examples of behavior 
constituting such improper means, including, but not limited to, 
“theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a 
breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through 
electronic or other means.”122 Conversely, the UTSA also identifies 
                                                                                                     
compete with the employer or disclose confidential information 
obtained from the employer, the initial promise of employment 
supports the covenant not to compete as well as any other 
commitments made by the employee. 
 118. See Gomulkiewicz, supra note 105, at 264 (noting continued employment 
is not sufficient consideration in some states for non-competes entered into during 
employment). 
 119. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1996) (defining 
misappropriation as an “acquisition of a trade secret by means that should be 
known to be improper and unauthorized disclosure or use of information that one 
should know is the trade secret of another”). 
 120. Jeff Danley, Cadence v. Avant!: The UTSA and California Trade Secret 
Law, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 289, 292 (2004) (“Consequently, under the UTSA, a 
trade secret holder may seek an injunction against another party that has 
improperly acquired its trade secret even before that other party has used or 
disclosed it.”). 
 121. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1996). 
 122. Id. § 1. 
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actions that do not qualify as misappropriation, including reverse 
engineering, observing the information in public display, and 
discovery by independent creation.123 
In addition to issuing an injunction preventing the disclosure 
or use of another’s trade secrets,124 courts may even go so far as to 
enjoin a departing employee from working for a competitor. Under 
what is known as the inevitable disclosure doctrine, some courts 
will issue an injunction preventing a company’s former employee 
from working for a competing firm—even if the employee has never 
signed a non-compete agreement—if it can be proven that a 
“defendant’s new employment will inevitably lead [the defendant] 
to rely on the plaintiff’s trade secrets.”125 In other words, even 
though the departing employee has neither engaged in actual 
misappropriation nor consented to a non-compete, a court may 
nevertheless enjoin employment when the former employee 
“cannot help but rely on [the former employer’s] trade secrets [in 
his/her new position] . . . and [it has been shown] that these secrets 
will enable [the new employer] to achieve a substantial 
advantage.”126 
When assessing the inevitability of disclosure—and thus 
deciding whether to grant an injunction—courts evaluate the 
following factors: (1) the degree of competition between the former 
and current employer; (2) whether the job duties of the two 
positions are comparable; and (3) “the extensiveness of the former 
employee’s knowledge of technical or managerial trade secrets.”127 
Courts have found that these factors were satisfied, and thus 
                                                                                                     
 123. Id. § 1 cmt. 
 124. See id. § 2 cmt. (observing that “[i]njunctions restraining [the] future use 
and disclosure of misappropriated trade secrets [are] frequently sought”). 
 125. PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 126. Id. at 1270; see also Jonathan O. Harris, Note, The Doctrine of Inevitable 
Disclosure: A Proposal to Balance Employer and Employee Interests, 78 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 325, 328 (2000) (“This doctrine is so named because employers base an 
inevitable disclosure claim on the theory that a former employee will inevitably 
disclose the former employer’s trade secrets in the performance of his new job.”); 
Shannon Aaron, Note & Comment, Using the History of Noncompetition 
Agreements to Guide the Future of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine, 17 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 1191, 1203 (2013) (“For most states, the inevitable disclosure 
debate centers around the interpretation of Section 2 of the UTSA that states, 
‘[a]ctual or threatened misappropriation may be enjoined.’”). 
 127. Garrison & Wendt, supra note 99, at 155. 
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awarded injunctive relief, in cases involving managerial 
executives128 and salespersons,129 for example. Although a 
majority of states have adopted some version of the inevitable 
disclosure rule along these lines,130 a growing number of 
jurisdictions have opted to reject the doctrine.131 California, for 
instance, has declined to enforce the doctrine because it “‘creates a 
de facto covenant not to compete’ and ‘runs[s] [sic] counter to the 
strong public policy . . . favoring employee mobility.’”132 
In addition to injunctive relief, the UTSA also entitles 
plaintiffs to damages for “both the actual loss caused by 
misappropriation and [any] unjust enrichment” received by the 
misappropriator.133 Punitive damages and attorney’s fees may also 
be awarded for willful and malicious misappropriation.134 
4. Economic Espionage Act 
The law of trade secrecy was first federalized and criminalized 
in 1996 with the passage of the EEA.135 Prior to the EEA, federal 
prosecutors had to primarily rely on federal statutes prohibiting 
mail and wire fraud—or, alternatively, a law targeting the 
                                                                                                     
 128. See PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1279 (holding that a former executive of a 
beverage company would inevitably disclose marketing and product development 
trade secrets to a competitor). 
 129. RKI, Inc. v. Grimes, 177 F. Supp. 2d 859, 876 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (enjoining 
a tube and pipe mill manufacturing salesperson from working for a competitor 
given evidence of both actual and inevitable misappropriation of proprietary data 
and customer contact information). 
 130. See id. at 156 (“Although the courts that have embraced inevitable 
disclosure have not done so in an entirely consistent fashion, the doctrine is now 
considered the majority rule.”). 
 131. See id. at 160–63 (detailing cases in California, New York, and Maryland 
rejecting the inevitable disclosure doctrine). 
 132. Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 101 Cal. App. 4th 1443, 1463 (2002) (“Lest 
there be any doubt about our holding, our rejection of the inevitable disclosure 
doctrine is complete.”) (citation omitted). 
 133. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1996); see also id. 
§ 3 cmt. (“A claim for actual damages and net profits can be combined with a claim 
for injunctive relief, but, if both claims are granted, the injunctive relief ordinarily 
will preclude a monetary award for a period in which the injunction is effective.”). 
 134. Id. § 3(b). 
 135. Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, 110 Stat. 3488 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–39 (2000)). 
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unauthorized access of a computer136—to attack trade secret theft, 
none of which were designed to specifically address the 
misappropriation of a trade secret.137 Indeed, in many cases these 
statutes did not apply to a specific incident of trade secret theft 
when it turned out that the misappropriator either avoided using 
the mail or electronic communications as part of his theft, or 
alternatively failed to permanently deprive the owner of the 
information (for instance, by simply memorizing a trade secret).138 
These limitations, combined with Congress’ growing concern over 
foreign economic espionage, led to the passage of the EEA.139  
The EEA’s definition of a trade secret generally echoes that of 
the UTSA,140 requiring that the owner has taken reasonable 
measures to keep the information a secret and that “the 
information derives independent economic value from not being 
generally known.”141 The EEA criminalizes two types of trade 
secret theft: (1) theft benefiting a foreign entity;142 and (2) cases of 
domestic theft for economic gain.143 Although targeting different 
types of trade secret theft, both forms contain nearly identical 
definitions of misappropriation, imposing liability on anyone who:  
(1) steals, or without authorization appropriates, takes, carries 
away, or conceals, or by fraud, artifice, or deception obtains a 
                                                                                                     
 136. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-474, 100 Stat. 
1213 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1)–(6)) (2008). 
 137. See Kelley Clements Keller & Brian M.Z. Reece, Economic Espionage 
and the Theft of Trade Secrets: The Case for a Federal Cause of Action, 16 TUL. J. 
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 8 (2013) (describing federal criminal statutes “that were 
not designed to penalize trade secret theft”). 
 138. See Seaman, supra note 67, at 331 (noting the difficulty in relying on 
more generalized federal criminal provisions to address trade secret theft). 
 139. See Keller & Reece, supra note 137, at 9–12 (describing the legislative 
history of the EEA). 
 140. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-788, at 12 (1996), as reprinted in 1996 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4021, 4031 (“The definition of the term ‘trade secret’ [in the EEA] is 
based largely on the definition of that term in the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.”). 
 141. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (2012). 
 142. Id. § 1831(a) 
 143. Id. § 1832(a); see also Adam Cohen, Securing Trade Secrets in the 
Information Age: Upgrading the Economic Espionage Act After United States v. 
Aleynikov, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 189, 203 (2013) (“One of the main reasons for the 
expansion of the EEA to domestic trade secret theft cases—which are far more 
common than theft by foreign ones—was concern that a foreign-only law would 
violate international trade treaties.”). 
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trade secret; (2) without authorization copies, duplicates, 
sketches, draws, photographs, downloads, uploads, alters, 
destroys, photocopies, replicates, transmits, delivers, sends, 
mails, communicates, or conveys a trade secret; [or] (3) receives, 
buys, or possesses a trade secret, knowing the same to have 
been stolen or appropriated, obtained, or converted without 
authorization . . . .144 
In contrast to civil liability under the UTSA, the EEA also 
prohibits both attempted trade secret theft and conspiracies to 
commit misappropriation, whether domestic or foreign.145 In 
addition, the EEA has a unique mens rea component, requiring 
proof of unlawful intent.146 Under the foreign espionage provision, 
for instance, the defendant must intend or know that the 
misappropriation will benefit a foreign entity.147 Similarly, under 
the more generalized domestic trade secret theft provision, the 
defendant must “(1) intend[] to misappropriate the secret and 
(2) either intend[] to use it for the economic benefit of someone 
besides the owner or intend[] or know[] that the use of the 
misappropriated secret will injure the owner.”148 Further, the 
trade secret must be “related to a product or service used in or 
intended for use in interstate or foreign commerce.”149  
An individual found in violation of the foreign espionage 
provision can face up to fifteen years in prison and a maximum $5 
million fine.150 An organization in violation of the foreign 
                                                                                                     
 144. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831(a)(1)–(3); see also id. § 1832(a)(1)–(3) (substituting 
“information” for “trade secret”).  
 145. Id. §§ 1831(a)(4)–(5), 1832(a)(4)–(5). 
 146. See Seaman, supra note 67, at 333 (“Unlike trade secret 
misappropriation under state law, the EEA demands proof of unlawful intent.”). 
 147. 18 U.S.C. § 1831 (2012). 
 148. Adam Waks, Note, Where the Trade Secret Sits: How the Economic 
Espionage Act is Inflaming Tensions in the Employment Relationship, and How 
Smart Employers and Employees are Responding, 3 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & 
ENT. L. 391, 397 (2014) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a)). 
 149. 18 U.S.C. § 1832; see also Robert Damion Jurrens, Fool Me Once: U.S. v. 
Aleynikov and the Theft of Trade Secrets Clarification Act of 2012, 28 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 833, 849 (2013) (remarking that the EEA broadened the definition of 
trade secrets by “removing the confusing ‘product produced for or placed in’ 
language [in the original definition] and acknowledging services as well as 
products”). 
 150. Id. § 1831, amended by The Foreign and Economic Espionage Penalty 
Enhancement Act, Pub. L. No. 112-269, 126 Stat. 2442 (Jan. 14, 2013). 
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espionage provision can be fined the greater of $10 million or three 
times the value of the stolen trade secret.151 Similarly, there are 
also criminal fines and prison terms associated with domestic 
trade secret theft.152 
5. Defend Trade Secrets Act 
Amidst growing concerns about foreign trade secret theft,153 
and the attendant costs to American companies,154 as well as calls 
for greater uniformity155 and a federal forum in this area of law,156 
Congress enacted the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) on May 11, 
2016.157 The DTSA amends the EEA to create a federal civil cause 
of action for misappropriation of a trade secret.158 Specifically, the 
new law covers the theft of any trade secret “related to a product 
                                                                                                     
 151. Id. § 1831(b). 
 152. See id. § 1832(a)–(b) (stating that individuals face a fine with no specified 
cap and a prison term of up to 10 years while organizations may be fined up to $5 
million). 
 153. See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ADMINISTRATION STRATEGY ON 
MITIGATING THE THEFT OF U.S. TRADE SECRETS 1 (2013), 
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-ccips/file/938321/download (“Emerging trends 
indicate that the pace of economic espionage and trade secret theft against U.S. 
corporations is accelerating . . . . Foreign competitors of U.S. corporations, some 
with ties to foreign governments have increased their efforts to steal trade secret 
information through the recruitment of current or former employees.”); see also 
Seaman, supra note 67, at 339 (discussing various government reports on the 
growing threat of trade secret theft). 
 154. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 152, at 1 (“Trade secret 
theft threatens American businesses, undermines national security, and places 
the security of the U.S. economy in jeopardy.”). 
 155. See Seaman, supra note 67, at 352–53 (documenting and countering the 
scholarly concern over a lack of procedural and substantive consistency under the 
current regime of state trade secret misappropriation laws). 
 156. See, e.g., David S. Almeling, Four Reasons to Enact a Federal Trade 
Secrets Act, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 769, 780–81, 791 (2009) 
(discussing the procedural benefits of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 
the advantage of federal court expertise in intellectual property law). 
 157. 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (2012). 
 158. See YEH, supra note 71, at 22 (“The legislation would amend the EEA’s 
definition section (18 U.S.C. Section 1839) to include definitions of the terms 
‘misappropriation’ and ‘improper means.’”). 
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or service used in, or intended for use in, interstate or foreign 
commerce.”159  
Notably, the DTSA does not preempt any state law trade 
secret claims.160 Instead, the DTSA is modeled after the UTSA, 
containing the same definition of a trade secret, similarly requiring 
that the trade secret owner take reasonable measures to maintain 
the secrecy of the information, and that the trade secret “derive[] 
independent economic value . . . from not being generally 
known.”161 Likewise, there is a similar three-year statute of 
limitations.162 Consistent with the UTSA, the DTSA prohibits two 
types of misappropriation: (1) acquisition by improper means and 
(2) use or disclosure of a trade secret acquired by improper 
means.163 And as with the UTSA, “improper means” is further 
defined to include “theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or 
inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage 
through electronic or other means,” but not reverse engineering or 
independent creation.164 
The DTSA is unique, however, in that it contains an ex parte 
seizure provision allowing a court, “under extraordinary 
circumstances, [to] issue an order providing for the seizure of 
property necessary to prevent the propagation or dissemination of 
the trade secret . . . .”165 To prevail on a seizure order, the plaintiff 
must establish, among other things, immediate and irreparable 
harm without the seizure, the inadequacy of other equitable relief, 
the likelihood of success in establishing misappropriation by 
improper means, and the existence of a trade secret.166 
Otherwise, the DTSA provides traditional injunctive and 
monetary relief for trade secret misappropriation, including actual 
damages, damages for unjust enrichment, and reasonable royalties 
for the unauthorized disclosure or use of the trade secret, as 
                                                                                                     
 159. 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(1). 
 160. See YEH, supra note 71, at 24 (stating that “the DTSA includes a ‘rule of 
construction’ provision that declares that nothing in the DTSA shall be 
construed . . . to preempt any other provision of law” including state laws). 
 161. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3). 
 162. Id. § 1836(d).  
 163. Id. § 1839(5)(A)–(B) 
 164. Id. § 1839(6). 
 165. Id. § 1836. 
 166. Id. § 1836(b)(2)(A)(ii). 
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necessary.167 However, the DTSA does not allow an employer to 
seek injunctive relief based on the inevitable disclosure doctrine; 
indeed, injunctive relief requires “evidence of a threatened 
misappropriation” and cannot be premised “merely on the 
information the person knows.”168 
B. Canada 
With the exception of the province of Québec, the law 
governing trade secrets in Canada has not been codified, but 
instead has evolved from the common law.169 Rooted in tort and 
contract doctrine, Canadian courts recognize a cause of action for 
breach of confidence at common law when someone misuses a 
company’s confidential information.170 Civil enforcement is the 
primary means of addressing trade secret misappropriation as 
there are no criminal provisions in Canada specifically addressing 
                                                                                                     
 167. Id. § 1836(b)(3)(C). 
 168. Id. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(I). 
 169. See 1 FRANÇOIS PAINCHAUD ET AL., TRADE SECRETS THROUGHOUT THE 
WORLD § 6:3 (2015) (“Although there are no trade secret statutes that set out the 
Canadian common law, there have been restatements that can be used as 
guidance for the Canadian common law.”). Aside from having been codified, 
Québec’s trade secrecy law is generally consistent substantively with that of the 
rest of the country. See, e.g., 2 JAMES POOLEY, LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
§ 48:11 (2016)  
One unusual aspect of Canadian trade secret law is the existence of 
dual systems: while Québec is a civil law jurisdiction with its own Civil 
Code, the other provinces of Canada base their rules on the common 
law of England. Nevertheless, in general, trade secret protection is 
governed by the same basic principles . . . . 
 170. See Allyson Whyte Nowak, Trade Secrets and Confidential Information, 
27 No. 8 ACC DOCKET S4, S4 (2009) (“While there is no statutory cause of action 
for the misappropriation of trade secrets or confidential information in Canada, 
the misuse of your company’s confidential information can give rise to a cause of 
action for breach of confidence at common law.”). 
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trade secrets.171 Both monetary and injunctive relief are available 
under Canadian law.172 
Similar to U.S. law, in order to prevail on a breach of 
confidence claim for the misappropriation of a trade secret, 
Canadian courts typically require the plaintiff to establish that it 
used appropriate methods under the circumstances to maintain 
the secrecy of the information at issue.173 However, unlike U.S. 
law, the plaintiff must additionally establish “the information was 
communicated in circumstances in which an obligation of 
confidence arises.”174 The knowledge of the confidential nature of 
the information may be established by the presence of a 
confidentiality agreement or implicit in a fiduciary or master and 
servant relationship.175 Surprisingly, however, Canadian law does 
not appear to directly address cases of industrial espionage or 
                                                                                                     
 171. See Protecting Trade Secrets: A Worldwide Survey, MANAGING INTELL. 
PROP., Dec. 1997–Jan. 1998, at 40, 43 (noting the lack of Canadian criminal trade 
secret statutes but recognizing that criminal theft or fraud laws may be applicable 
if the trade secret is considered property); see also Emir Crowne & Tasha De 
Freitas, Canada’s Inadequate Legal Protection Against Industrial Espionage, 13 
CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 192, 194–97 (2013) (discussing R. v. Stewart, where 
the court held the unauthorized use of confidential information could not be 
recognized as theft under the Criminal Code); Nowak, supra note 170, at S5 
(noting Canadian law does not consider misappropriation of trade secrets to be 
theft under the Criminal Code). 
 172. Damon L. Boyd, Trade Secret Doctrines of the NAFTA Countries: The 
Sources of Law, the Remedies Available, and Suggestions for Improvement, 14 
ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 879, 898 (1997). 
 173. See Nowak, supra note 170, at S5 (2009) (“As in the United States, in 
Canada the ability to prevent the unauthorized use of a trade secret depends upon 
the owner's ability to demonstrate that it has been maintained as confidential 
through the use of physical or contractual means.”). 
 174. Id.; see also Saltman Eng’g Co. Ltd. v. Campbell Eng’g Co. Ltd., [1963] 3 
All E.R. 413 (C.A.). 
 175. See Boyd, supra note 172, at 892 (“Essentially, in order for the 
information to be considered confidential it must be sufficiently private and it 
must also be communicated to the other party either with a warning that it is 
considered confidential, or under circumstances that make the confidential 
character sufficiently clear.” (internal quotation omitted)); see also Nowak, supra 
note 170, at S5 (“Obligations of confidence can arise through contract or 
relationships of confidence, whether they be fiduciary or that of a master and 
servant.”); Coco v. A. N. Clark (Engineers), [1969] R.P.C. 41, 48 (“[I]f the 
circumstances are such that any reasonable man standing in the shoes of the 
recipient of the information would have realised [sic] that upon reasonable 
grounds the information was being given to him in confidence, then this should 
suffice to impose upon him the equitable obligation of confidence.”). 
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other forms of trade secret theft, in which the proprietary 
information is obtained via means other than being communicated 
to the misappropriator in confidence.176 Finally, Canadian law 
requires the plaintiff to establish that the unauthorized use of the 
information would cause a harm or detriment to the plaintiff.177 
IV. Survey Methodology and Results 
Most of the various forms of proprietary data and knowledge 
potentially owned by North American professional sports teams—
as identified in Part I, supra—will easily satisfy the first criterion 
for trade secret protection under U.S. and Canadian law, as they 
will almost always constitute “information” under the prevailing 
legal definitions.178 Moreover, such information will also typically 
possess commercial value, as it will either allow the team to better 
market its product to consumers,179 or else enable the club to 
improve its performance on the playing field (economists have 
consistently found that winning increases a sports team’s 
revenues).180  
Consequently, whether a sports team’s proprietary 
information will qualify for legal protection under trade secrecy 
law will usually hinge on the extent to which the information is not 
publicly known, and the measures that a team takes to protect 
                                                                                                     
 176. See, e.g., Crowne & De Freitas, supra note 171, at 192 (“Canadian law 
provides little protection for individuals and corporations against the very real 
threat and damage of industrial espionage.”).  
 177. See Boyd, supra note 172, at 892 (“The third and final element of the 
doctrine of confidentiality is that the information must have been used to the 
detriment of the owner.”). 
 178. See supra note 76 and accompanying text (discussing the definition of 
“information” under the UTSA); see also Frankel, supra note 11, at 265 
(concluding that “compilations of baseball statistics” would fall within the UTSA’s 
definition of information under the conception of a “compilation”). 
 179. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (discussing business-related 
trade secrets that teams may possess). 
 180. See, e.g., Stefan Kesenne, Competitive Balance in Team Sports and the 
Impact of Revenue Sharing, 20 J. SPORT MGMT. 39, 40 (2006) (noting, “[t]he season 
revenue of each club depends on three important variables: a) the size of the 
market, which affects the potential of the club to draw supporters and players; b) 
the winning percentage of the team, because supporters prefer to watch a winning 
team; and c) the uncertainty of outcome” (emphasis added)).  
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it.181 And while one cannot assess how publicly widespread the 
knowledge of a particular piece of information might be without a 
team disclosing the secret—thereby undermining its claim to 
secrecy—ascertaining the steps that professional sports teams are 
taking to protect their proprietary knowledge presents a more 
reasonable inquiry. 
A. Survey Methodology 
Along those lines, we conducted a survey of teams in the four 
major North American professional sports leagues to determine 
both (i) the general types of proprietary information that they are 
asserting trade secret protection over, and (ii) the measures that 
they are taking to protect that data or knowledge. Specifically, 
through the use of non-random, purposive sampling,182 we began 
by identifying a population of potential survey recipients 
consisting of the in-house legal counsel or chief legal officers183 for 
all of the teams in the four major North American sports 
leagues.184 Of the 122 teams currently belonging to these four 
leagues, all but four employed one or more attorneys in some sort 
of legal capacity.185 For those 118 teams that employed a lawyer, 
                                                                                                     
 181. See supra notes 78–86 and accompanying text (explaining that trade 
secrets must not be publicly known and must have been protected by reasonable 
measures to keep the information secret). 
 182. In a survey using purposive sampling, “a specific population is identified 
and only its members are included in the survey.” Kate Kelley et al., Good Practice 
in the Conduct and Reporting of Survey Research, 15 INT’L J. QUALITY IN HEALTH 
CARE 261, 264 (2003). 
 183. While most professional sports teams employ one or more individuals in 
a position titled general counsel or director of legal affairs, in a few cases lawyers 
serving in other roles (e.g., team president, chief operating officer, or even the 
team’s owner) appeared to be chief legal officer for the franchise. 
 184. This identification process occurred in March and April of 2016. 
 185. In several instances, teams list an attorney employed by their parent 
corporation as their general counsels; these individuals were included in the pool 
of potential survey recipients. Similarly, in a few cases, a team identified a lawyer 
practicing at an outside law firm as its general counsel; these individuals were 
also listed as potential survey recipients. In other instances, the same individuals 
serve as legal counsel for two commonly owned franchises belonging to different 
leagues.  
Meanwhile, it is interesting to note that—for whatever reason—the four teams 
who did not appear to employ any in-house lawyers or regular outside counsel 
were all in the NHL (the Calgary Flames, Chicago Blackhawks, San Jose Sharks, 
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we were then able to locate e-mail addresses for an attorney 
employed by 115 of these teams through public searches. These 
individuals were each sent an email containing a link to an online, 
ten-question survey.186 Recipients then subsequently received two 
follow-up messages over the course of the next month. In order to 
maximize the number of responses, the survey was conducted 
anonymously, with respondents promised that specific responses 
would not be tracked or associated with a particular team.  
Ultimately, responses were received from 19 of the 115 teams 
to whom the survey was sent, representing a response rate of 
16.5%.187 This response rate is generally consistent with—if not 
slightly above—that of the average online survey.188 Indeed, 
considering the potential sensitivity of the information sought in 
the survey, this rate of response was arguably quite high. Notably, 
however, this response rate, coupled with the fact the survey was 
conducted on an anonymous basis, means that no degree of 
statistical representativeness can be inferred from the survey 
results; instead, the data presented below are offered strictly on a 
descriptive basis. 
B. Survey Results 
Although the identity of each respondent’s team affiliation 
was not tracked, Question 1 of the survey asked respondents to 
identify which league their team belonged to. As listed in Table 1, 
with the exception of MLB, the responses were roughly divided 
                                                                                                     
and St. Louis Blues). 
 186. The website SurveyMonkey.com was used to host the survey and process 
the responses.  
 187. The nineteen respondents reported here answered at least a majority, if 
not the entirety, of the ten questions appearing on the survey. Because some of 
these responses omitted answers to one or more questions, however, some of the 
percentages listed below are based upon a smaller number of total responses, 
reflecting the number of responses that answered each particular question. 
Meanwhile, one respondent only provided an answer to the survey’s first 
question—identifying which league his or her team belonged to—and therefore 
was not included among the nineteen total responses discussed above. 
 188. See Andrea Fryrear, Survey Response Rates, SURVEYGIZMO (July 27, 
2015), https://www.surveygizmo.com/survey-blog/survey-response-rates/ (last 
visited Sept. 21, 2017) (reporting that most external, online surveys receive a 
response rate of 10–15%) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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evenly among teams in the other three major North American 
sports leagues. 
Table 1. League Membership of Survey Respondent Teams 
League       Number of Respondents 
Major League Baseball 2 
National Basketball Association 7 
National Football League 4 
National Hockey League 6 
Total 19 
It is not clear why MLB teams responded at such a relatively 
low rate. Indeed, while nearly one-quarter of NHL teams that were 
contacted provided responses to the survey (6 of 25), only two of 
the 29 MLB teams contacted ultimately responded (a rate of less 
than 7%). One possible explanation is that, because MLB teams 
have traditionally relied on statistical and data analysis on the 
most widespread basis,189 these teams may consequently be more 
hesitant to discuss this information. Alternatively, because an 
MLB team was the first to fall victim to corporate espionage in the 
digital age,190 baseball teams may have simply been more 
reluctant to share information in this regard. Meanwhile, because 
the survey was conducted in May and June of 2016, it is also 
possible that the response rate from professional baseball teams 
was lower due to the fact that MLB was the only one of the four 
leagues in the midst of its regular playing season,191 presumably one 
of the busiest times of the year for teams’ in-house counsel. Finally, 
however, MLB teams’ lower response rate could, of course, simply 
be the result of random chance. 
Unsurprisingly, the overwhelming majority of responding 
teams reported that they currently assert trade secret protection 
over at least one of the categories of information listed in Table 2. 
  
                                                                                                     
 189. See supra notes 21–24 and accompanying text (discussing the 
prominence of statistical analysis in professional baseball).  
 190. See supra notes 58–61 and accompanying text (discussing the first 
instance of corporate espionage in the professional sports context). 
 191. See Schedule, MLB, www.mlb.com/schedule (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) 
(providing the Major League Baseball’s season schedules from March 2008 to 
present) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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Table 2. Types of Information Subject to Trade 
Secret Assertion 
Types of Information Number of 
Respondents 
Percentage of Total 
Respondents (n=19) 
Scouting reports (player or 
team) 
17 89.47% 
Trade proposal or 
discussion notes 
15 78.95% 
Playbooks 9 47.37% 
Verbal/hand signals used 
on playing field 
2 10.53% 












Statistical analyses 14 73.68% 




Not applicable 1 5.26% 
Other 2 10.53% 
Indeed, the most surprising aspect of the results above would 
probably be the fact that one team—belonging to the NBA—
reported that it did not claim trade secret protection over any of 
the types of information identified on the survey. In addition, one 
respondent noted that his or her franchise also asserted trade 
secret protection over a variety of other, more 
core-business-related processes, in addition to the more directly 
sports-competition-related types of information listed above. 
Of those teams that reported that they do currently assert 
trade secret protection over one or more of the categories of 
information above, the most common forms of proprietary 
information identified—scouting reports (89.47%) and trade 
discussion notes (78.95%)—were both among the more traditional 
types of sports-competition-related knowledge that a team might 
possess. Notably, however, the next most common types of 
information listed were statistical analyses (73.68%) and biometric 
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analyses (tied with skill development techniques at 52.63%), both 
of which are among the more advanced types of potential trade 
secrets in use today. This finding would appear to support the 
anecdotal evidence discussed above suggesting that the use of data 
analysis is emerging as a growing source of potential competitive 
advantage for teams in all four major North American sports 
leagues.192 
Table 3. Methods Used to Protect Trade Secrets 






Computer security methods 
(password protection, ewalls,  
etc.) 
18 94.74% 




Not applicable 1 5.26% 
Other 1 5.26% 
Of those 18 respondent-teams that reported that they 
currently assert trade secret protection over at least one form of 
proprietary knowledge, all 18 of these franchises stated that they 
utilize both computer security methods and NDAs to help keep this 
information secret (as indicated in Table 3). In addition, over 78% 
of responding teams also reported using non-compete agreements 
to maintain secrecy as well.193 This result suggests that the use of 
non-compete agreements may be even more commonplace in the 
professional sports industry than in other sectors of the economy, 
                                                                                                     
 192. See supra notes 40–44 and accompanying text (comparing the use of data 
analytics across the four sports).  
 193. Although three responding teams neglected to list non-compete 
agreements as being among the methods they used to protect their trade secrets 
in response to Question 3, these clubs’ subsequent answers to later questions in 
the survey strongly suggested that they did, in fact, ask at least some of their 
employees to sign a non-compete. As a result, it appears that these three teams 
inadvertently neglected to select non-compete agreements as an option when 
answering this question, and thus for both completeness and consistency sake, 
these franchises have been included among the 15 teams that are listed as using 
non-compete agreements in the data presented in Table 3.  
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as prior studies examining firms’ use of non-competes have found 
that anywhere from 55% to 70% of surveyed companies use these 
agreements.194 Finally, one respondent notes that in addition to 
the methods identified above, his or her team also attempts to 
protect its trade secrets “by hiring people who take these rights 
seriously.” 
Table 4. Team Employees Required to Sign 
Non-Compete Agreements 





Coaches 6 33.33% 
Players 3 16.67% 
Front office personnel 
(general managers, etc.) 
9 50.00% 
Scouts 4 22.22% 
Trainers / doctors / 
nutritionists 
4 22.22% 
Statistical analysts 7 38.89% 
Computer programmers / 
developers 
5 27.78% 
Not applicable 4 22.22% 
Other 3 16.67% 
The survey’s next four questions all dealt specifically with 
teams’ use of non-compete agreements. As revealed in Table 4, the 
category of team employee most likely to be subjected to a 
non-compete agreement was front-office personnel such as the 
club’s general manager or assistant general managers (i.e., the 
employees most directly responsible for building a franchise’s 
player roster through trades, free agency signings, and draft 
picks). Indeed, 50% of responding teams said they require at least 
some of their front office personnel to sign a non-compete. 
Meanwhile, the second most common category of employee 
subjected to a non-compete agreement was statistical analyst, 
another position whose duties directly relate to building the team’s 
playing roster, suggesting that franchises are most protective of 
                                                                                                     
 194. See Norman D. Bishara & Evan Starr, The Incomplete Noncompete 
Picture, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 497, 520 (2016) (summarizing the existing 
literature on firm use of non-compete agreements). 
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the competitive advantages they believe workers employed in this 
capacity give them over their rivals.  
Interestingly, three teams—two in the NBA, and one in the 
NHL—reported that they required their players to sign 
non-compete agreements as well. This result is particularly 
surprising considering that player mobility in each of the four 
major North American sports leagues is governed by a 
collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) between the applicable 
players union and league, with all four leagues guaranteeing their 
players the right to freely move between franchises after reaching 
a certain level of seniority.195 As a result, it is not clear what the 
scope of these non-compete agreements between a player and team 
may be.196  
Finally, it is also worth noting that the data reported in 
Table 4 should not be read to suggest that all of a team’s employees 
in a particular category are necessarily subject to non-compete 
agreements. Indeed, as discussed in greater detail below,197 in 
some cases a team may elect to subject some of its employees in a 
certain category to a non-compete agreement, but decide not to 
subject others working in a similar capacity to the same 
restraint.198 Consequently, it is impossible to determine what 
                                                                                                     
 195. See, e.g., Chris Deubert, Putting Shoulder Pads on Schleck: How the 
Business of Professional Cycling Could Be Improved Through A More American 
Structure, 37 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 65, 80–81 (2011)  
In American sports, we are familiar with the concept of free agency, 
e.g., when a player has accrued a certain amount of experience as 
determined by a collective bargaining agreement (‘CBA’) between his 
union and the teams, and his contract has expired, he may offer his 
services to any and all bidders for a salary limited only by the terms of 
the CBA. 
 196. One possibility is that teams are restricting players from going to work 
for competing franchises in a front-office, coaching, or scouting capacity once their 
playing careers have ended. Alternatively, these respondents may be 
characterizing provisions in their leagues’ standard players contract prohibiting 
players from playing for another franchise during the term of the contract as 
constituting a non-compete agreement. 
 197. See infra notes 201–203 and accompanying text (discussing how teams 
may be reluctant to subject some categories of employees to non-compete 
agreements because they each wish to be able to freely recruit executives away 
from one another). 
 198. For example, even though a number of teams reported requiring some of 
their front office personnel to sign non-compete agreements, teams frequently 
recruit high-level front office executives away from one another, suggesting that 
PROTECTING BIG DATA IN THE BIG LEAGUES 1609 
percentage of a responding team’s employees—either within any of 
the individual categories above, or overall—are subject to a 
non-compete agreement from the data reported above. 
Question 5 inquired as to the reasons why a team might elect not 
to require its employees to sign a non-compete agreement. Notably, 
relatively few teams appear to be concerned with the potential legal 
unenforceability of a non-compete agreement, a finding consistent 
with the fact that some form of non-compete agreement is enforceable 
in most jurisdictions.199 Unfortunately, given the anonymous nature 
of the survey, it is impossible to determine whether those teams 
expressing concern about the legal enforceability of non-compete 
agreements happen to reside in California, one of the two states whose 
law generally takes the most restrictive view of such contracts.200  
Table 5. Reasons Why Team Employees Are Not Required 
to Sign a Non-Compete Agreement 






Lack of need; employee does 






Ethical concerns  0 0.00% 
League-wide rules prohibit use  1 5.56% 
League-wide custom against 
use  
3 16.67% 
Employee refusal to sign 0 0.00% 
Recruiting concerns 0 0.00% 
Not applicable 7 38.89% 
Other 1 5.56% 
                                                                                                     
not all of these employees are subject to a non-compete agreement.  
 199. See supra notes 102–104 and accompanying text (noting that 
non-compete agreements are enforceable under the law of most states). 
 200. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (noting that non-compete 
agreements are generally unenforceable under California state law). Meanwhile, 
the other state taking a highly restrictive view of non-competes, North Dakota, 
does not host a team in any of the four major North American sports leagues. 
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Also noteworthy is the fact that three teams—one from MLB 
and two from the NFL—reported that there is a general custom 
against the use of non-compete agreements within their league. To 
the extent such a custom exists, it is likely motivated by a 
recognition that the potential universe of qualified applicants for 
many of the vacancies that a sports team may need to fill can often 
be quite small, due to the fact that assessing and coaching playing 
talent is a highly unique and specialized skill in each of the four 
sports.201 So even if it might be in a team’s short-term interest to 
subject all of its coaches, scouts, or front office personnel to 
non-compete agreements, in the long-run franchises may recognize 
that they would ultimately be hurt by the league-wide adoption of 
such a strategy, since it could hinder clubs from ever hiring 
qualified external candidates.202 As a result, it would make sense 
that some leagues would adopt a custom against the use of 
non-compete agreements for at least some categories of employees, 
in order to ensure that their franchises will be able to freely access 
a sufficient pool of qualified candidates for the inevitable future 
vacancies that may arise.203 At the same time, however, the fact 
that 63% of responding teams—including at least one from each of 
the four major North American sports leagues—reported using 
non-compete agreements raises questions regarding just how 
widespread the recognition of such a custom may actually be. 
  
                                                                                                     
 201.  In other words, the ability to assess the skills of professional baseball 
players does not necessarily translate into an ability to assess those of 
professional basketball players, and vice versa. Similarly, the exact knowledge 
and skills needed to build a quality team roster, or to best physically train players 
for peak on-field performance, will also vary across sports. 
 202. See Moore, supra note 40 (observing that the increasingly advanced 
nature of MLB teams’ proprietary statistical analyses makes it harder for those 
outside the industry to stay current on the latest and most advanced knowledge). 
 203. Indeed, as revealed in Table 9 below, at least one team has refrained 
from requiring certain of its employees to sign NDAs due to the concern that 
widespread use of this technique within its league could hamper its future 
recruiting efforts. 
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Table 6. Scope of Non-Compete Agreements 






Working for team in same 
league 
12 70.59% 




non-sports-related business in 
same geographic region 
0 0.00% 
Not applicable 4 23.53% 
Other 0 0.00% 
Given the unique and specialized nature of many of the skills 
utilized by a team’s various employees in each of the four sports,204 
it is not surprising that—as reported in Table 6—teams most 
frequently restrict their employees from going to work for a 
competing franchise in the same league. Interestingly, however, at 
least two teams extend this restriction to working for franchises in 
competing leagues as well. Indeed, while certainly rare, there has 
been at least one case in which an executive left a team in one sport 
to join a franchise in a different league.205 
Finally, as noted in Table 7, respondent teams varied with 
regard to the length of time that they restrict their employees from 
working for a competing franchise. That having been said, 10 of 
the 11 teams to identify a temporal limit to the duration of their 
non-compete agreements limit the restriction to no more than two 
years. This majority approach is generally consistent with the 
growing trend among courts to restrict the allowable duration of 
                                                                                                     
 204. See supra note 201 and accompanying text (discussing the level of 
specialization necessary to identify, assess, and coach playing talent in each of 
the four major North American sports). 
 205. Specifically, in 2016, Paul DePodesta, the former vice president of player 
development and scouting for MLB’s New York Mets, left the team to join the NFL’s 
Cleveland Browns as the franchise’s new chief strategy officer. See David Fleming, 
Why Paul DePodesta is Bringing Moneyball to the Browns, ESPN (Apr. 11, 2016), 
http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/15159159/why-paul-depodesta-bringing-moneyball
-browns (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (discussing same) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
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non-compete agreements to two years or less,206 while at the same 
time likely providing sufficient protection for much of a team’s 
proprietary information (which will often be outdated within the 
span of a season or two). Meanwhile, one NFL team reported that 
its non-compete provisions typically apply for the duration of the 
term of the contract, should the employee prematurely terminate 
his or her employment with the club. 
Table 7. Duration of Non-Compete Agreements 






Less than six months 0 0.00% 
Six months to one year 4 23.53% 
1+ years 6 35.29% 
2+ years 1 5.88% 
3+ years 0 0.00% 
4 or more years 0 0.00% 
Not applicable 6 35.39% 
The survey’s final three questions related to teams’ use of 
non-disclosure or confidentiality agreements. As with the 
non-compete agreements discussed above, Table 8 suggests that 
front office personnel are also the most likely to be required to sign 
an NDA. Once again, this is not particularly surprising given that 
front office workers are among the most likely categories of team 
employees to possess the types of proprietary information directly 
related to a club’s team-building activities (such as statistical or 
biometric data analyses, scouting reports, and trade discussions). 
For this same reason, it is unsurprising that responding teams 
reported that their statistical analysts and computer developers 
are frequently asked to sign NDAs as well. 
  
                                                                                                     
 206.  See supra notes 112–113 and accompanying text (discussing the 
allowable duration of non-compete agreements under the law of most states).  
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Table 8. Team Employees Required to Sign a 
Non-Disclosure / Confidentiality Agreement 






Coaches 13 81.25% 
Players 5 31.25% 
Front office personnel 
(general managers, etc.) 
15 93.75% 
Scouts 11 68.75% 
Trainers / doctors / 
nutritionists 
9 56.25% 
Statistical analysts 12 75.00% 
Computer programmers / 
developers 
10 62.50% 
Not applicable 0 0.00% 
Other 3 18.75% 
Interestingly, however, coaches are the second most likely 
category of team employee to be subjected to a confidentiality 
agreement. This is notable because whereas only 33% of 
responding franchises required their coaches to sign non-compete 
agreements, 81% of these same franchises asked their coaches to 
sign NDAs. This suggests that teams may be hesitant to prevent 
coaches from freely moving between franchises—perhaps in 
recognition of the frequent need to look outside of their own 
organizations for coaching talent—but nevertheless recognize the 
potential for their coaches to take valuable proprietary information 
to a new employer. 
Similarly, it is also noteworthy that five of the responding 
teams reported requiring their players to sign NDAs. As with 
coaches, this strategy makes some sense—to the extent it is 
permitted by a league’s CBA207—as even though teams may be 
unable to restrict their players from freely moving between 
franchises, they still undoubtedly wish to prevent these players 
from disclosing the team’s proprietary information—such as 
                                                                                                     
 207. One responding team from the NBA reported, for instance, that its 
league CBA prevented it from imposing an NDA on its players. 
1614 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1567 (2017) 
playbooks, and training or dietary regimens—to their new 
employers. 
Finally, three respondents, all from the NBA, noted that their 
teams require all of their employees to sign NDAs as a condition of 
employment.  
Table 9. Reasons Why a Team Employee Is Not Required to 
Sign a Non-Disclosure / Confidentiality Agreement 






Lack of need; employee does 






Ethical concerns  0 0.00% 
League-wide rules prohibit 
use  
0 0.00% 
League-wide custom against 
use  
3 18.75% 
Employee refusal to sign 0 0.00% 
Recruiting concerns 1 6.25% 
Not applicable 7 43.75% 
Other 1 6.25% 
Meanwhile, Table 9 reveals that responding teams indicated 
that an employee’s lack of access to trade secret information is the 
most common reason why a particular worker would not be 
required to sign a confidentiality agreement. Similarly, three 
responding teams—one each from the NFL, NHL, and MLB—
observed that there was a custom against the use of NDAs for 
certain categories of employees across their league. This is the 
same number of teams that indicated their use (or lack thereof) of 
non-compete agreements was restrained due to a league-wide 
custom.208 Meanwhile, one team also reported that it was 
concerned that widespread use of NDAs within its league could 
hamper its efforts to fill vacancies in the future. 
                                                                                                     
 208. See supra notes 201–203 and accompanying text (discussing the reasons 
why a sports team may not subject an employee to a non-compete agreement). 
PROTECTING BIG DATA IN THE BIG LEAGUES 1615 
Finally, Table 10 supplies data regarding the duration of the 
NDAs that teams require their employees to sign. Unlike for 
non-compete agreements—which the overwhelming majority of 
clubs restricted in duration to less than two years—responding 
teams were much more divided over the length of the 
confidentiality requirements. Some of this discrepancy may be due 
to the fact that states take differing views as to the allowable 
duration of legally enforceable NDAs,209 while some teams may 
have instead determined that there is no need to impose a 
confidentiality obligation of more than a year or two on their 
employees because many of their most valuable trade secrets will 
likely have a relatively short shelf life. Indeed, the longer the 
duration of a non-disclosure provision that employees in an 
industry are subjected to, the more difficult it can be for employees 
to freely move between employers (or, at least, fully integrate 
themselves into their new employer’s operations after being 
hired).210 Thus, some teams may be opting to shorten the duration 
of their confidentiality agreements in order to help facilitate free 
movement within the industry. 
  
                                                                                                     
 209. See supra note 95 and accompanying text (reporting that states impose 
different permissible time limits on NDAs). 
 210. See, e.g., Alan L. Durham, Natural Laws and Inevitable Infringement, 93 
MINN. L. REV. 933, 986 (2009) (noting that “a confidentiality agreement could later 
restrict [employee] mobility”); Patricia A. Meier, Looking Back and Forth: The 
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition and Potential Impact on Texas Trade 
Secret Law, 4 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 415, 439 (1996) (stating that 
“confidentiality . . . clauses can . . . severely limit a workers mobility, inhibit the 
use of acquired skills, and stifle economic growth”). 
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Table 10. Duration of Non-Disclosure / 
Confidentiality Agreements 






Less than six months 0 0.00% 
Six months to one year 1 6.67% 
1+ years 5 33.33% 
2+ years 3 20.00% 
3+ years 1 6.67% 
4 or more years 2 13.33% 
Not applicable 3 20.00% 
V. Implications and Suggestions for Future Research 
While a precise assessment of whether teams in the four major 
North American professional sports leagues are taking sufficient 
precautions to protect the secrecy of their proprietary information 
would require a heavily fact-intensive, case-by-case analysis, the 
survey data reported in Part IV, would appear to suggest that 
teams are generally taking sufficient measures to guard their 
trade secrets. Indeed, the uniform adoption of computer security 
methods,211 as well as the widespread use of NDAs with the 
employees most likely to possess commercially sensitive, 
proprietary information,212 indicates that the responding teams 
are, for the most part, protecting their data responsibly. Assuming 
that these teams also generally restrict access to their proprietary 
information on a need-to-know basis—and that the underlying 
information is not publicly known—then it would appear that they 
would typically be able to satisfy the current standard for trade 
secret protection under existing law.213 
Considering that most teams are likely taking sufficient 
means to protect their proprietary information, along with the 
relative frequency with which employees tend to move between 
                                                                                                     
 211. Supra Table 3. 
 212. Supra note 207 and accompanying text. 
 213. See supra Part II (discussing the standards for trade secret protection 
under U.S. and Canadian law). 
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professional sports franchises, it may be somewhat surprising that 
trade secret disputes have not generated more litigation to date 
within the industry. Even without a non-compete agreement, for 
instance, teams would often appear to have a strong argument that 
a departing front-office executive, statistical analyst, coach, or 
trainer should be subject to an injunction under the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine.214 Since these individuals cannot be expected 
to completely forget any proprietary information they may have 
learned from their prior clubs upon beginning employment with a 
new franchise, teams would appear to have valid grounds to seek 
an injunction preventing their former employees from working in 
a similar capacity for rival clubs under this doctrine, at least in the 
states where it is recognized.215  
Nevertheless, it does not appear that any professional sports 
team has ever gone to court to prevent an employee from working 
for a rival franchise—or from otherwise using or disclosing its 
proprietary information—on trade secret grounds. Indeed, the only 
reported court decision considering the status of proprietary 
sports-related knowledge under trade secrecy law came in 2012, in 
the case of National Football Scouting, Inc. v. Rang.216 Rather than 
involving a trade secret claim by a professional sports team, 
however, the Rang case centered on a journalist’s use of scouting 
reports belonging to a private scouting service.217 
The lack of litigation activity by professional sports teams in 
this area can likely be attributed in no small part to the restrictive 
rules that each of the four leagues imposes on its franchises. Under 
                                                                                                     
 214. See supra notes 125–127 and accompanying text (explaining the 
standard for an injunction under the inevitable disclosure doctrine). 
 215. See supra notes 130–132 and accompanying text (finding that a majority 
of states have adopted the inevitable disclosure doctrine). 
 216. Nat’l Football Scouting, Inc. v. Rang, 912 F. Supp. 2d 985 (W.D. Wash. 
2012). 
 217. See id. at 988 (discussing the facts of the case, such as the plaintiff’s role 
as a scouting organization in providing reports to its shareholders). In Rang, the 
court ultimately held that the plaintiff’s proprietary scouting reports constituted 
“information” and thus were potentially protectable under trade secret law. Id. at 
996. However, because the court believed that a “factual dispute exist[ed] over 
whether [the plaintiff] ha[d] made reasonable attempts to preserve the secrecy of 
the information,” the court refused to grant summary judgment on the plaintiff’s 
misappropriation claim. Id. at 996–97. The parties ultimately settled before that 
latter question could be resolved. See Frankel, supra note 55, at 85 (noting that 
the parties in Rang eventually settled the case). 
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each league’s constitution, for example, teams are generally 
prohibited from suing each other, or one another’s employees, in 
court.218 Instead, any dispute between rival franchises and/or their 
employees is generally subject to arbitration before their 
respective league commissioner.219 
Given that the four leagues have each largely prevented their 
teams from litigating any potential trade secret disputes—along 
with the fact that teams face differing legal landscapes under their 
applicable state’s trade secrecy laws220—this is an area that would 
seem to be particularly ripe for the formulation of league-wide 
policies regarding the protection of proprietary data. Under 
existing law, for instance, teams residing in California would 
appear to be at a significant competitive disadvantage due to their 
state’s prohibition of non-compete agreements,221 especially 
considering the frequency with which the survey data reported 
above suggests these restraints are being utilized across the 
team-sports industry.222  
However, depending on the nature of the policy adopted, 
attempts to formulate league-wide trade-secret protection 
standards could raise potential antitrust concerns. Should a league 
                                                                                                     
 218. See, e.g., MAJOR LEAGUE CONST., art. VI, § 1, http://law.uh.edu/assign 
ments/summer2009/25691-b.pdf 
All disputes and controversies related in any way to professional 
baseball between Clubs or between a Club(s) and any Major League 
Baseball entity(ies) (including, in each case, without limitation, their 
owners, officers, directors, employees and players) . . . shall be 
submitted to the Commissioner, as arbitrator, who, after hearing, shall 
have the sole and exclusive right to decide such disputes and 
controversies [and whose decision shall be final and unappealable]. 
 219. See, e.g., NAT’L HOCKEY LEAGUE CONST., art. VI, § 6.3(b)(5), 
http://v1.theglobeandmail.com/v5/content/pdf/CoyotesDaly.pdf  
The Commissioner shall have full and exclusive jurisdiction and 
authority to arbitrate and resolve . . . any dispute involving a Member 
Club or Clubs, or any players or employees of the League or any 
Member Club or Clubs, or any combination thereof, that in the opinion 
of the Commissioner is detrimental to the best interests of the League 
or professional hockey or involves or affects League policy. 
 220. See supra Part II (observing, for instance, that states take differing views 
on the enforceability of non-disclosure and non-compete agreements). 
 221. See supra notes 102–104 and accompanying text (discussing California’s 
limitations on the use of non-compete agreements). 
 222. See supra notes 193–194 and accompanying text (noting that over 78% 
of responding teams reported using non-compete agreements). 
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mandate a minimum length for its clubs’ NDAs, for instance, 
affected employees could potentially file suit under the Sherman 
Act contending that the league’s rule illegally restrains trade by 
preventing teams from competing in the employment marketplace 
by offering more attractive (i.e., less restrictive) terms to their 
prospective employees.223  
That having been said, a league could nevertheless 
presumably adopt other, less restrictive rules that would help to 
level the playing field among its teams with respect to trade secret 
protection. By enacting a league-wide prohibition against 
non-compete agreements, for example, leagues could ensure that 
their California-based franchises are on equal footing with their 
rival teams. Similarly, by enacting a league-wide limitation on the 
maximum length of a potential non-disclosure obligation, leagues 
could ensure that teams in states taking a more restrictive view of 
these covenants are not disadvantaged in the same way.224 
Because league rules along these lines would not directly harm any 
third parties by artificially restraining competition between teams, 
they would appear to be less likely to trigger potential legal 
liability, and would thus represent a sensible strategy for the 
leagues to adopt to help place their teams on equal footing with 
regards to protecting their trade secrets. 
Another area in which leagues may wish to regulate their 
teams’ protection of proprietary information—albeit for entirely 
different reasons—relates to the use of certain biometric analyses 
and physical training or therapy techniques. As noted in Table 2, 
                                                                                                     
 223. Because most team employees subjected to non-disclosure or 
non-compete obligations—unlike players—have never formed a union, these 
league-wide rules would not be shielded from scrutiny under the Sherman Act by 
the so-called non-statutory antitrust exemption, and therefore would expose the 
leagues to potential treble damages. See, e.g., Marc Edelman & Joseph A. Wacker, 
Collectively Bargained Age/Education Requirements: A Source of Antitrust Risk 
for Sports Club-Owners or Labor Risk for Players Unions?, 115 PENN. ST. L. REV. 
341, 365 (2010) (explaining that the non-statutory labor exemption “shields from 
antitrust scrutiny any conduct that is reached through the proper workings of the 
collective bargaining relationship”). Admittedly, this concern may not be as 
compelling for MLB, due to its historic exemption from antitrust law. See, e.g., 
Nathaniel Grow, In Defense of Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 
211 (2012) (providing an overview of the historical development of baseball’s 
antitrust exemption). 
 224. See supra notes 93–96 and accompanying text (discussing state-level 
restrictions placed on NDAs). 
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supra, more than half of responding teams reported possessing 
trade secrets relating to biometric analyses, while over 35% and 
40% of teams, respectively, reported that they protect various 
physical therapy and training techniques. While much of this 
activity is unlikely to raise concern, the creation and use of some 
proprietary methods in this area could give rise to potential ethical 
issues that warrant league action. 
For instance, if a single team were to develop a proprietary 
formula allowing it to identify players who are at particular risk 
for a career-threatening injury—such as a torn ulnar collateral 
ligament (UCL) in a baseball pitcher’s elbow225—or were to create 
a training or therapy regimen that enabled its players to better 
avoid the risk of such injuries in the future, the resulting method 
would represent a tremendous source of competitive advantage for 
the franchise.226 At the same time, however, allowing one team to 
retain proprietary control over this type of information would have 
potentially profound ethical implications for the rest of the 
industry, subjecting countless other players—at both the amateur 
and professional levels—to a needless risk of future injury.227 
As a result, considering that the survey data reported above 
suggests that a significant number of teams may already be 
claiming trade secret protection over these types of proprietary 
information, each of the four major sports leagues should consider 
taking steps to regulate their franchises’ activity in this regard. 
Along these lines, leagues could limit the use of, or entirely 
prohibit their teams from enforcing, NDAs or covenants not to 
compete against the categories of employees—such as doctors or 
trainers—most likely to possess knowledge relating to injury 
                                                                                                     
 225. For an in-depth discussion of the increasing frequency of UCL injuries in 
both amateur and professional baseball, see JEFF PASSAN, THE ARM: INSIDE THE 
BILLION-DOLLAR MYSTERY OF THE MOST VALUABLE COMMODITY IN SPORTS (2016). 
 226. See, e.g., Matthew Trueblood, Rubbing Mud: A Solution Does Not Exist, 
BASEBALLPROSPECTUS (Mar. 5, 2015), http://www.baseballprospectus.com/article.php? 
articleid=25709 (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (quoting Andrew Friedman, president of 
MLB’s Los Angeles Dodgers, as saying, “I would contend that any kind of advantage in 
injury prevention is significant”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 227. See Injuries Increase As Pitchers Throw Harder, Faster And Younger, 
NPR (Mar. 31, 2016), http://www.npr.org/2016/03/31/472541597/ 
injuries-increase-as-pitchers-throw-harder-faster-and-younger (last visited Sept. 21, 
2017) (noting the “inherent conflict” when teams “are doing everything they can to 
figure out [injury prevention techniques] and not tell[ing] anyone about it”) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
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prevention techniques. At a minimum, leagues should make an 
effort to invest in their own injury prevention research, centralized 
within the league office, to help ensure that any strides made in 
this area will benefit all players and teams on an equal basis. 
Finally, with regards to future research activity, this study 
has highlighted the current lack of empirical data regarding the 
types of information that are being subjected to trade secret 
protection in the modern economy, as well as the ways in which 
the secrecy of this knowledge is being protected. Indeed, prior to 
this study, it appears that the only published research of this sort 
dates back to 1965 and 1971, respectively.228 While researchers 
may have previously assumed that firms would be reluctant to 
share this type of information, given its potential sensitivity, the 
present study suggests that companies in other industries—
especially those in less intensely competitive fields than 
professional sports—would likely be willing to disclose some 
general details regarding their trade secret practices.  
Meanwhile, although the survey data presented here provides 
a novel look at the protection of trade secrets within the 
professional sports industry, it does not paint a complete picture. 
In particular, further research regarding the manner in which 
teams differentiate between employees when deciding whom to 
subject to a non-disclosure or non-compete obligation would be 
instructive.229 Along these lines, although potentially difficult to 
conduct, a survey conducted at the employee-level could, if feasible, 
yield particularly interesting results. Such data would help 
provide a clearer indication of the overall rate at which employees 
in the professional sports industry are subject to non-disclosure or 
non-compete agreements. 
                                                                                                     
 228. See generally O’MEARA, HOW SMALLER COMPANIES PROTECT THEIR TRADE 
SECRETS, supra note 13; O’MEARA, EMPLOYEE PATENT AND SECRECY AGREEMENTS, 
supra note 13. 
 229. For instance, as noted above, despite the fact that 50% of responding 
teams reported requiring their front-office personnel to sign non-compete 
agreements, the fact that teams routinely hire front-office executives away from 
one another would suggest that the enforcement of these provisions may not be 
uniform. Supra Table 5; supra notes 202–203 and accompanying text. 
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VI. Conclusion 
This Article has explored the protection of trade secrets in the 
professional sports industry. In particular, through the 
presentation of freshly collected survey data, the Article has shed 
new light on both the types of information being subjected to trade 
secret protection by franchises in the four major North American 
sports leagues, as well as the methods that these teams use to 
preserve the secrecy of their proprietary knowledge. In the process, 
this Article has identified ways in which sports leagues may wish 
to act in order to level the playing field amongst their franchises—
especially in light of the differing legal regimes governing teams in 
this area at the state level—while also highlighting the need for 
additional research regarding the trade secret protection practices 
of firms within both the professional sports industry and the 
economy at-large. Indeed, considering the increasingly significant 
role that big data is poised to play in the economy in coming years, 
issues surrounding the legal protection of this sort of proprietary 
information will only take on heightened importance in the future. 
